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CHAPTER 7 
Trusts and Estates 
ROBERT G. STEWART* AND KATHERINE L. BABSON, JR.** 
§ 7.1. Culpable Neglect-Promise to make a Will-Damages. During the 
Survey year, in Hastoupis v. Gorgas, • the Massachusetts Appeals Court 
decided that, under section 10 of chapter 197 of the General Laws, a 
creditor was not chargeable with "culpable neglect" for failing to bring his 
claim for services rendered within the nine month statute of limitations. 2 
The court in Hastoupis also discussed the measure of damages in cases in-
volving breaches of promise to make a will. 3 The claimant, Hastoupis, had 
immigrated with his family from Greece to Massachusetts. 4 Shortly after 
their arrival, they met the decedent, their relative, who was elderly and quite 
wealthy, and they moved into the decedent's home. 5 Hastoupis' family 
cared for the decedent for the last five years of his life, performing domestic 
chores, maintenance work on his real estate, and nursing care. 6 The clai-
mant had given up an opportunity to buy his own business. 7 The decedent 
on numerous occasions promised to leave the claimant one-half of his 
estate, 1 but when he died, he had made no such provision in the will. 9 
Within a month of the death, the claimant contacted an attorney to repre-
sent him. The claimant frequently called the attorney and visited him to in-
quire about the progress of the case. Although the attorney assured him that 
the claim would be timely filed, it was not. 10 The attorney was ill 
throughout most of the case. •• When the attorney died, Hastoupis engaged 
another attorney who filed a complaint in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Suffolk County, 12 seeking section 10 relief from the bar of the nine-month 
statute of limitations. 13 The case was remanded to the superior court14 
• ROBERT G. STEWART is a partner in the law firm of Hutchins & Wheeler, Boston. 
•• KATHERINE L. BABSON, JR., is an associate in the law firm of Hutchins & Wheeler, 
Boston. 
§ 7.1. • 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 43, 398 N.E.2d 745. 
' /d. at 47, 398 N.E.2d at 748. 
' /d. at 50-54, 398 N.E.2d at 750-53. 
• Jd. at 45, 398 N.E.2d at 747. 
'ld . 
• /d. 
7 /d. af 45, 398 N.E.2d at 747. 
• Id. at 45-46, 398 N.E.2d at 747-48. 
• /d. at 47, 398 N.E.2d at 748 . 
•• /d. 
II /d . 
... /d. 
" /d. at 43-44, 398 N.E.2d at 746-47. The claimant Hastoupis was a "creditor" of the 
deceased for purposes of the short statute of limitations. Kofinke v. Maranhas, 375 Mass. 141, 
145, 375 N.E.2d 711, 714 (1978). 
•• 1980 Mass. AJ!P. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 44, 398 N.E.2d at 747. 1
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where the judge granted the relief and awarded a judgment of $375,000." 
The executor appealed' 6 and the Appeals Court affirmed. 17 
The court rejected the executor's argument that Hastoupis was 
chargeable with "culpable neglect" for relying on his original attorney. 18 
The court apparently was influenced by several facts: that the claimant con-
sulted with and retained an experienced member of the bar, and that on 
several occasions the claimant was assured that his interests would be cared 
for. The court also noted that the claimant spoke limited English, that he 
did not have any formal education, and that he was not familiar with legal 
rules.' 9 The court also rejected the argument that the original attorney was 
culpably neglectful and that his neglect vicariously bound the claimant, 20 
finding that the attorney's actions were within "the,range of ordinary ex-
cusable fallibility. " 2 ' 
The meaning of "culpable neglect" given in Hastoupis goes beyond 
historical cases. Although the term has not been limited to instances of 
fraud, accident, or mistake, 22 it has been described as one which encom-
passesd the neglect of an individual attributable to his own "carelessness, 
improvidence or folly.'' 23 The court in Hastoupis appeared to exclude from 
the term those instances which arise from an attorney's "inadvertence, 
misunderstanding, illness or some other cause other than neglect or breach 
of duty. " 24 Furthermore, such actions by the attorney would not be at-
tributable to the creditor client. The creditor might be responsible, however, 
for his attorney's "mere procrastination in callous disregard of professional 
responsibilities. " 25 Whereas the Hastoupis court arguably could have found 
for the claimant because of his original attorney's illness, the court chose 
rather to find that the attorney had misunderstood or had misinterpreted 
the provisions of the short statute of limitations. 26 As a result, it is not clear 
whether the court purposely chose to open another avenue of attack for sec-
tion 10 claims or whether it was particularly sympathetic to the plight of the 
practitioners with respect to the two "fairly radical changes" in the section 
9 limitations period. 27 In either case, the court undoubtedly will see claims 
" /d. at 44, 398 N.E.2d at 747. 
" /d. at 43, 398 N.E.2d at 746. 
" !d. at 44, 398 N.E.2d at 747. 
11 /d. at 47-49, 398 N.E.2d at 748-49. 
" Id. at 48-49, 398 N.E.2d at 749. See Downey v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405,408-09, 
45 N.E.2d 373, 376 (1942). Cf. First Portland National Bank v. Taylor, 323 Mass. 492, 83 
N.E.2d 161 (1948), (creditor held to be not diligent in inquiring of his attorney about the pro-
gress of the case). 
20
.1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 49-50, 498 N.E.2d at 749-50. 
2
' /d. at 50, 498 N.E.2d at 750. 
22 Ewing v. King, 169 Mass. 97, 102,47 N.E. 597,599 (1897). See 1 NEWHf\LL, SETILEMENT 
OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETIS, § 192 (4th ed. 1958). 
" Waltham Bank v. Wright, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 121, 122 (1864). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 49, 398 N.E.2d at 749. 
" !d. 
" /d. at 50, 398 N.E.2d at 749-50. 
" /d. The law changed twice in one year. Acts of 1971, c. 548, § 1, approved mi July 21, 
2
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for section 10 relief based on a misunderstanding or a misapplication of the 
law by a creditor's attorney. 
Having found that section 10 relief was properly granted, the court 
directed its attention to the issue of damages. The court attempted to clarify 
the type of evidence the court will consider in cases involving a breach of 
contract to make a will. 21 To reach the issue, the court in Hastoupis first 
had to find that an express agreement existed, that the decedent had promis-
ed to leave one-half of his estate to plaintiff in exchange for plaintiff's per-
formance of services, and that the plaintiff had fulfilled the terms but that 
the decedent had not. 29 Because the Statute of Frauds30 prevented the en-
forcement of the oral contract to make the will, 31 the plaintiff's action was 
based on quantum meruit for the value of the services rendered. 32 
Hastoupis follows a long line of cases in Massachusetts which permit 
recovery in quantum meruit when an action on the contract has been barred 
by the Statute of Frauds. 33 The theory behind the recovery is not to provide 
an indirect means to avoid the statute, but to prevent the statute from being 
used as an instrument of fraud by compelling the defendent to pay for what 
he has received. 34 The measurement of damages is thus based on principles 
of restitution, to prevent the defendant from being unduly enriched. 35 
1971; (effective with respect to estates of persons dying on or after January 1, 1972), Acts of 
1972, c. 256 (silent as to whether it had prospective or retrospective effect). See 1980 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 50, n. S, 398 N.E.2d at 750, n. S; 1 NEWHALL, SEITLEMENT OF ESTATES 
AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, § 189 (4th ed. 1958 & 1980 supp.). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 50-54, 398 N.E.2d, at 750-52. 
" Id. at 50-51, 398 N.E.2d at 750. The element of reliance on the promise to make a will 
traditionally has been essential to a finding that a party can recover in quantum meruit. The 
lower court had found that the claimant had relied on the decedent's promise. Id. at 43-44, 398 
N.E.2d 746-47. See Heil v. McCann, 360 Mass. 507, 509, 512, 275 N.E.2d 889, 890-91, 892 
(1971); Turner v. White, 329 Mass. 549, 553, 109 N.E.2d ISS, 157 (1952); Hollister v. Old Col-
ony Trust Co., 328 Mass. 225, 228, 102 N.E.2d 770, 772 (1952); Raine v. Shea, 259 Mass. 412, 
413, 156 N.E. 541, 541 (1927). But see 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 51, n. 6, 398 N.E.2d at 
750, n. 6; Stoney v. Soar 322 Mass. 408, 410, 411, 76 N.E.2d 645, 647 (1948). 
•• G.L. c. 259, § SA. 
" The Statute of Frauds must be pleaded affirmatively. Shopneck v. Rosenbloom, 326 
Mass. 81; 83-84, 93 N.E.2d 227, 228 (1950). If it is not so pleaded, recovery on a breach of con-
tract theory may be made. See Larivee v. Vanasse, 320 Mass. 213, 216, 68 N.E.2d 688, 690 
(1946). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 44, 51, 398 N.E.2d at 746, 750. 
" See Parady v. Lewis, 338 Mass. 800, 157 N.E.2d 531 (1959) (couple moved in with elderly 
man and maintained his house; promised to leave them the house); Turner v. White, 329 Mass. 
549, 109 N.E.2d ISS (1952) (couple moved onto farm and maintained it for 33 years; promise 
to leave them the farm); Hollister v. Old Colony, 328 Mass. 225, 102 N.E.2d 770 (1952) (step-
daughter was driver for 10 years; promise to leave a bequest); Raine v. Shea, 259 Mass. 412, 
156 N.E. 541 (1927) (woman did housework and nursing for 14 years; promise to leave her en-
tire estate); Dixon v. Lamson, 242 Mass. 129, 136 N.E. 346 (1922) (woman rendered services 
for 8 years; promise to devise one-half of property). See also cases cited in G. NEWHALL, SET-
TLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, §§ 181, 239 (4th ed. 1958). 
,. Downey v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass 405, 411, 45 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1942). See Heil v. 
McCann, 360 Mass. 507, 511, 275 N.E.2d 889, 892 (1971). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 51, 398 N.E.2d at 750. See Note, Contracts to Devise 
and Bequeath in New England, 39 B. U. L. REV. 62, 71 (1959). 3
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The court in Hastoupis refined the holding in Green v. Richmond36 
with respect to the measurement of damages. The Hastoupis court said that 
the injury may be of two kinds: services of a routine and ordinary nature 
which need not require any evidence as to value, 37 and services for which 
there exists no established value in the marketplace and which cannot be 
measured by ordinary standards. 38 In determining the value of the second 
kind of services, the court stated that the situation and relationship of the 
parties, 39 the nature and extent of the services, ' 0 and the value of the estate 
should be considered. 41 The value of the estate is evidence of the "price" 
one of the parties has put on the services and is an admission against that 
party's interest. 42 The value of the estate cannot be the "per se measure of 
damages, however."43 The Hastoupis court found that the lower court had 
applied the evidence properly. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment. 44 
§ 7 .2. Mistake-Fiduciary Relationship-Rescission-Counsel Fees. 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court refined the standards for the 
attorney-client relationship in trusts and estates practice, and specified the 
consequences of failures to perform up to that standard, in Markell v. 
Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc. 1 The Appeals Court held that where an 
attorney, even one who is a natural object of a settlor's bounty, prompts or 
induces a settlor to execute a trust in which the attorney has even an indirect 
" 369 Mass. 47, 337 N.E.2d 691 (1975). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 52, 398 N.E.2d at 751. Cf. Mason v. Black, 341 Mass. 
347, 349, 169 N.E.2d 899, 901 (1960) (expert testilhony not necessary to determine value of 
nursing services and care). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 52, 398 N.E.2d at 751. See Downey v. Union Trust Co., 
312 Mass. 405, 417, 45 N.E.2d 373, 380 (1942). 
" A presumption exists that the services rendered by a child to a parent are gratuitous and 
the burden is on the child to rebut it. Sherry v. Li_ttiefield, 232 Mass. 220, 223, 122 N.E. 300, 
304 (1919). See Mason v. Black, 341 Mass. 347, 348, 169 N.E.2d 899, 901 (1960). 
4
' See Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 57-58, 337 N.E.2d 691, 698-99 (1975). 
41 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 52-53, 398 N.E.2d at 751. 
42 /d. at 53, 398 N.E.2d at 751. The authority for the admission into evidence of the value of 
the estate already has been established in earlier cases. See Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 
55-58, 337 N.E.2d 691,697-99 (1975); Turner v. White, 329 Mass. 549, 109 N.E.2d 155, (1952) 
(plaintiffs entitled to show value of land); Downey v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405,413-14, 
45 N.E.2d 373, 378 (1942)(value of promised annuity); Foman v. Davis, 316 F.2d 254, 256-57 
(1st Cir. 1963). 
4
, 1980 M{ISS. App. Ct, Adv. Sh. at 54, 398 N.E.2d at 752. The lower court had received 
evidence in the form of "estate and tax documtrits" which showed the size of the gross estate, 
the amount of taxes, debts and pecuniary legacies arid the size of the residue (approximately 
$1.3 million). /d. at 53, 398 N.E.2d at 751. In Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 337'N.E.2d 
691 (19'75), the Court held that it had been error to admit the probate inventory as evidence of 
the value of the estate, since no preliminary inquiry had been made as to its reliability as 
evidence of the "net value of the estate". /d. at 59, 337 N.E.2d at 699. 
'" 1980 Mass App;,Ct. Adv. Sh. at 44, 53, 55, 398 N.E.2d at 747, 751, 752. The court also 
found thit it would not overrule the award because the damages may have been based oD some 
.mces provided by the plaintiff's wife. /d. at 54, 398 N.E;2d_at 752. 
I 7.2. ' 1980 Mass •. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 557, 402 N.E.2d 76. 
4
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future benefit, and where the attorney has a close relationship of trust and 
confidence with the settlor, the attorney has an affirmative obligation to 
assure that the settlor fully understands the nature of the attorney's benefit 
and the nature and legal effect of all provisions of the instrument. 2 It fur-
ther held that the failure to fulfill that affirmative obligation was a suffi-
cient ground for a rescission of the instrument on the basis of mistake, that 
is, a misunderstanding by the settlor of the legal effect of the instrument. 3 
The principal operative facts in Pfeifer were as follows. Minney Hey 
was an elderly immigrant, with little or no business training, who relied ful-
ly on professionals for investment and business decisions; 4 She exhibited a 
propensity over the years for making and changing her estate plan, usually 
remembering charities and various relatives and other individuals who from 
time to time performed services for her. 5 Over the years, most of her 
relatives died or became estranged, except for her nephew, Sidney Pfeifer. 6 
For some time, Minnie had not been close to Sidney because of her dislike 
for his wife. 7 During the ten years after Sidney and his wife separated, Min-
nie gradually grew closer to Sidney and began to rely heavily on his business 
and investment judgment. • Their personal relationship grew to the point of 
her making substantial gifts of property to him from time to time. 9 
Although Sidney was an attorney, Minnie relied upon him not so much for 
legal advice as for assistance in managing her investments. 10 
In 1960, at the age of 86, while at a vacation lodge recuperating from 
an injury, and apparently at Sidney's behest, Minnie transferred a substan-
tial portion of her assets to herself and Sidney as trustees of an irrevocable 
trust prepared by one of Sidney's attorneys. 11 By its terms, she retained a 
life income interest and gave the remainder to Sidney. 12 In three successive 
years, supplementary trust agreements were executed, which added essen-
tially all of Minnie's remaining intangible property to the 1960 trust. 13 
In 1966, Sidney created the Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc., a 
private foundation to benefit the performing arts, and executed a will leav-
ing his entire residuary estate in trust to Minnie for life, and the remainder, 
2 /d. at 583, 402 N.E.2d at 92. 
' /d. at 590, 402 N.E.2d at 96. 
• /d. at 563, 402 N.E2d at 82. 
' /d. at 564-67, 402 N.E.2d at 83-84. 
• /d. at 563-64, N.E.2d at 82. 
7 /d. at 567-68, 402 N.E.2d at 84. 
• IJJ. at 577-79, 402 N.E.2d at 89-90. 
' /d. at 561-68, N.E.2d at 84. 
•• See id. at 577-79, 402 N.E.2d at 89-90. 
" Id. at 568-69, 402 N.E.2d at 85. 
12 The trust contained a right for Minnie to redirect the remainder interest to other heirs-at-
law. /d. at 569, 402 N.E.2d at 85. Since all of her other living heirs were estrapged, id. at 
563-64, 402 N.E.2d at 82, it was unlikely that this right would ever be exercised. The alleged 
draftsman of the trust suggested that the purpose of the reserved power was to avoid a com-
pleted gift for gift tax purposes. /d. at 569, 402 N.E.2d at 85. 
" /d. at 569, ~ ·N.E.~ 1!-t 85. 
5
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one-half to a close friend and one-half to the Foundation. 14 He also ex-
ecuted and funded a revocable trust reserving the income to himself for life 
and then to Minnie for life, with the remainder to the Foundation. 15 At the 
suggestion of one of Sidney's attorneys, a new trust agreement for Minnie 
was drawn up to replace the 1960 trust. 16 The 1966 trust was almost iden-
tical to the 1960 trust, except that in the event Sidney predeceased Minnie, 
the property was to be paid to the Foundation. 17 There was conflicting 
evidence concerning the extent to which Sidney explained the terms of the 
1960 trust to Minnie, and the extent to which a bank trust officer asked by 
Sidney to handle the execution of the 1966 trust explained its terms to Min-
nie. 18 There was no suggestion that any attempt was made to conceal any 
aspect of either instrument. 19 
Shortly after Sidney's death in 1967, Minnie became distraught about 
her financial affairs, asserting that she had never intended to give up 
ultimate control of her assets. 20 On the advice of counsel, she executed pur-
ported amendments to the trust which, if valid, would have eliminated the 
remainder gift to the Foundation in favor of relatives. 21 She also executed a 
new will to the same effect. 22 
Determined to rescind the 1960 and 1966 instruments, Minnie executed 
an affidavit outlining the events leading up to the execution of both. 23 In the 
affidavit she alleged that she did not understand the 1960 and 1966 
documents to be trusts, and that she did not understand that by executing 
and transferring her property to the trusts she was thereby alienating her 
power to dispose of her property as she should wish. 24 Based on that af-
fidavit, she instituted a proceeding in the probate court seeking a determina-
tion of the invalidity of the 1960 and 1966 trusts. 25 Three days later Minnie 
died, and the case was pursued by her executor. 26 
The probate court found that Sidney had induced Minnie to execute the 
trust without a full understanding of its legal effect and, therefore, ruled 
" Id. at 570, 402 N.E.2d at 85. 
" /d. 
" Since Minnie and Sidney were the only interested persons in the first trust, the attorneys 
and the court apparently assumed that the irrevocable trust could be terminated and replaced 
by their joint action. I d. at 570, 402 N .E.2d at 86. IV A. SCOTI, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§ 338 (3d 
ed. 1967). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 570-71, 402 N.E.2d at 86. 
" Id. at 576-81, 402 N.E.2d at 89-91. 
" Id. at 583, 402 N.E.2d at 92. 
" /d. at 571, 402 N.E.2d at 86. 
21 /d. at 558 & n.1, 572, 402 N.E.2d at 79 & n.1, 86. 
12 /d. 
" /d. at 572, 402 N.E.2d at 86. 
,. Id. 
" /d. In the alternative, she requested a declaration that the trust amendments were valid, 
id., a point the court did not have to reach. /d. at 590, 402 N.E.2d at 96. 
" /d. at 572, 402 N.E.2d at 86-87. The successor trustees of Minnie's trust submitted their 
rights to the court, id. at 592, n.14, 402 N.E.2d at 97, n.14 and the suit was defended solely by 
the Foundation. 
6
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that the trust was void. 27 There was no allegation of incapacity at the time 
of execution of either trust and the case was not decided on the ground of 
undue influence. 21 Moreover, as the Appeals Court emphasized, the pro-
bate court's factual findings fell short of showing fraud or deceit on the part 
of Sidney.29 The executor's sole argument on appeal was that the trust was 
voidable based on the law of mistake. 30 The Appeals Court held that the 
probate court was justified in finding grounds for rescission of the 1960 and 
1966 trusts on the basis o(mistake. 31 It upheld factual findings that the in-
struments were executed without the understanding that their legal effect 
was to alienate the powers Minnie had previously enjoyed in her individual 
capacity to control and dispose of the trust assets as she might wish. 32 The 
court understood the crucial factual finding in the case to be that neither 
Sidney nor the advisors he provided for Minnie adequatefy explained to her 
the fact that the 1960 and 1966 trusts were irrevocable. 33 Because 
misunderstanding of legal effect in and of itself is not a ground for rescis-
sion, the court's holding required an elaborate analysis of Sidney's relation-
ship with Minnie. 
The Appeals Court's analysis began with the proposition that a volun-
tary trust completely established with no power of revocation cannot be 
revoked by the settlor without proof of mental unsoundness, mistake, fraud 
or undue influence. 34 All of these grounds, except mistake, were foreclosed 
by the probate court's findings. Under settled principles of Massachusetts 
law, mere misconception of the legal effect of clear language in an instru~ 
ment is not grounds for rescission." Where an individual holding a 
fiduciary relationship to the settlor induces the settlor's action and stands to 
benefit thereby, however, and where the rights of innocent third parties 
have not intervened, the instrument can, according to the Appeals Court, be 
" /d. at 558, 402 N.E.2d at 79. 
" Id. at 583, 402 N.E.2d at 92. 
"Id. 
•• /d. In addition, the Foundation argued as a procedural matter that the Appeals Court 
should make its own findings of fact, rather than give any weight to the trial judge's findings. 
!d. at 559, 402 N.E.2d at 80. The premise for this challenge was the Foundation's claim that 
the trial judge had "mechanically adopted" the plaintiff's proposed findings of fact. /d. The 
Appeals Court determined that the trial judge's findings were not to be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. /d. at 574, 402 N.E.2d at 88. Concluding that the trial court's reliance on the plain-
tiff's prepared narrative did not constitute such an error, the Appeals Court decided to accord 
the trial judge's factual findings their customary weight on appeal. /d. at 576, 402 N.E.2d 
at 89. 
" /d. at 590, 402 N.E.2d at 96. 
" /d. at 583, 402 N.E.2d at 92. The court specifically stated that its holding was not ground-
ed on fraud, deceit or undue influence and that the facts would not support a finding of any of 
those grounds. /d. 
" This finding was in dispute, but the Appeals Court in essence held that an adequate 
evidentiary basis existed to support the probate court's conclusion. /d. at 582-83, 402 N.E.2d 
at 91-92. 
" /d. at 583, 402 N.E.2d at 92. 
" Coolidge v. Loring, 235 Mass. 220, 224, 126 N.E. 276, 277 (1920). 7
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voided where the fiduciary failed to make the settlor fully aware of the ef-
fect. 36 Three related doctrines contributed to the court's finding: the gen-
eral standards of conduct in the attorney-client relationship, the less strict 
criteria established for the attorney who is a friend or family member of the 
client, and the emerging fiduciary standards governing cases where a settlor 
has become dependent in fact upon another person's judgment. The court 
began its analysis with the law governing business transactions between at-
torney and client. The cases uniformly hold that the attorney must not only 
refrain from any misrepresentation or concealment of any material facts in 
such dealings, but must use active diligence to assure that his client is fully 
informed of the nature and effect of the transaction proposed and the 
nature and effect of the attorney's own rights and interest in the subject 
matter. 37 Furthermore, the attorney in this position must ensure that his 
client either has independent advice in the matter, or else receives from the 
attorney the same advice he would have expected to give had the transaction 
been one betwee his client and a stranger. 38 
The same standard of attorney conduct applied, according to the court, 
to an attorney dealing with the client in relation to the creation of a trust. 39 
Sidney, the probate court held, failed to make absolutely clear to Minnie his 
interest and that of his Foundation, and failed adequately to assure that she 
understoQd the fact that her disposition of assets was irrevocable. 40 Sidney's 
conduct therefore could not stand if measured simply by the standard im-
posed for attorney-client business dealings. 41 
Because Sidney was acting in effect as Minnie's attorney, the analysis 
would seem to end here. The court, however, was troubled because Sidney 
was a close friend and relative, as well, and, therefore, a natural object of 
Minnie's bounty. 42 In such a case a lesser, not greater, standard of fiduciary 
conduct seems to apply: 43 
But it is not invariably true that, when an attorney performs a 
legal service for another, a strict attorney-client relationship exists. 
Not infrequently an attorney will draft a will or do estate planning 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at S8S, 402 N.E.2d at 93. See also Webster v. Kelly, 274 
Mass. S64, S71, 17S N.E. 69, 71 (1931). 
" Israel v. Sommer, 292 Mass. 113, 124, 197 N.E. 442, 448 (193S); Hill v. Hall, 191 Mass. 
2S30 262, 77 N.E. 831, 83S (1906); Goldman v. Kane, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 341, 329 N.E.2d 
770, 773 (197S). 
" See note 37 supra. 
" 1980Mass. App. Ct; Adv. Sh. at S86, 402 N.E.2d at 94, 
•• /d., 
.. /d. 
•• /d. at S88, 402 N.E.2d at 9S. 
•• Id. at,W,1.to2 ~.E.2d at 94, (citing Ruczinski v. Russ, 337 Mass. Sl4, ISO N.E.2d 10 
(19S8); Frawley v. Snell, 299 Mass; 398, 12 N.E.2d 871 (1938)). These <;_ases involved wills 
drafted by an attorney who was a close friend or relative, but the dispositiov was natur&l and 
did not favor~ the draftsman over other heirs or friends. See Ruczinski v. Russ, 337 Mass. at 
Sl4, Sl6. ISO N.E.2d at 11; Frawley v. Snell, 2.99 Mass. at 403-04, 12 N.E.2d at 873. 
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work for a relative or close friend and associate; and in such a case, if 
the attorney or a member of his immediate family is named as a 
beneficiary, a court called upon to examine the transaction, although 
it may suggest that the better practice would be for an independent at-
torney to do such work ... , and although it may state that such a 
transaction should be viewed with great circumspection, . . . will not 
apply to such a transaction the presumption of impropriety which is 
applied when dealing with one whose fiduciary status is un-
complicated by ties of blood, marriage, or close friendship. 44 
The difference between pure attorney-client cases and "friend or family" 
cases, according to the court, is that in the strict attorney-client case it can 
reasonably be presumed that the relationship influenced the transaction. 45 
The policy of the law favors the fiduciary's duty of loyalty and discourages 
business or donative transactions which inure to the fiduciary's personal 
benefit. 46 On the other hand, where there is a relationship of family or 
friendship, gifts or other acts of generosity are natural and to be expected; 
therefore, the reason for the presumption of impropriety dissolves. 47 
Because Sidney was Minnie's next-of-kin and heir presumptive, the court 
reasoned that there could be no presumption of impropriety. 48 Absent other 
factors the lesser fiduciary standard would apply. 
The "friend or family" cases were not dispositive either, however, as 
to the applicable fiduciary standard. Sidney's relationship to Minnie 
transcended a simple friend or family situation. It was also one of 
dependency-a relationship of trust and confidence. Where an individual 
has achieved such a close relationship of trust and confidence with a donor 
that the donor was in fact dependent on the other's judgment in business af-
fairs and property matters, fraud or undue influence can arise easily. 49 Ac-
cording to the court, these cases forbid the abuse of such a relationship to 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 587, 4o2 N.E.2d at 94 (citations omitted). 
" /d. at 588, 402 N.E.2d at 95 . 
.. /d. 
" /d. See also Butler v. Gleason, 214 Mass. 248, 101 N.E. 371 (1913); Woodbury, 141 Mass. 
329, 5 N.E. 275 (1886). During the Survey year the Appeals Court affmned in a rescript the 
rescission of a deed where the elderly grantor was accompanied to an attorney's office and in 
the meeting qreed to execute the deed. Marshall v. Marshall, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
1767, 1768, 409 N.E.2d 1322, 1323. The court's action was based on the grounds of undue in-
fluence supported by the failure by one in a position of trust and confidence to assure full 
understandin,g of the adverse legal consequences. /d., 409 N.E.2d at 1323-24. 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 588, 402 N.E.2d at 95. The court failed to take note of 
the implicit limitation in the earlier cases that the draftsman not be favored over other heirs. 
Although Minnie's other heirs were estranged, some mention of the absence of normal or 
logical gifts to Minnie's friends. would have been appropriate in the court's analysis. 
" /d. at 589,402 N.E.2d at 95 (citing Stetson v. French, 321 Mass. 195, 199,72 N.E.2d 410, 
412 (1947)); Akin v. Warner, 318 Mass. 669, 674, 63 N.E.2d 566, 569 (1945); Hawkes v. 
Lackey, 207 Mass. 424, 431-32, 93 N.E. 828, 829-30 (1911). 
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the personal advantage of the other party. 50 In addition, the court held, 
such a relationship carries with it the same positive obligations to explain to 
the donor the interests involved, and the legal effect of the donor's actions, 
as exists in the case of the pure attorney-client relationship. 51 
Sidney was a close personal confidant of Minnie, upon whom she relied 
almost exclusively for judsment in business and property affairs. 52 
Therefore, the court concluded, notwithstanding his friendship or family 
ties, he undertook as a matter of law an obligation not only to refrain from 
concealing the legal effect of the trust documents from Minnie, but also to 
exercise active diligence to assure she was fully aware of the irrevocable 
nature of those acts which would inure ultimately to his benefit or that of 
his Foundation. 53 Because the probate court had found facts sufficient to 
indicate that Minnie was not fully advised of the effect of the trusts, Sidney 
breached his fiduciary duty to Minnie to assure that she did so understand 
the facts. 54 Because the lack of understanding was found to be based on 
such breach of fiduciary obligation and because only Sidney and his suc-
cessor in interest, the Foundation, would benefit thereby, the document was 
properly voided on the grounds of mistake. 55 
The court's analysis is clear and needs little elaboration. The analysis is 
not entirely novel, 56 but most cases involving fiduciary overreaching or non-
disclosure turn on undue influence directly, 57 and none have gone to such 
lengths first to avoid a finding of undue influence and then to weave its very 
principles back into the law of mistake. Fundamental to a finding on either 
ground is the existence of the requisite relationship of trust and 
confidence, 51 or some de jure fiduciary relationship, and proof that con-
cealment, overreaching or nondisclosure led to a material misunderstan-
ding. 59 One practical result of the Pfeifer approach, therefore, may be to 
encourage more litigation by donors where the stigma of such a suit may 
have deterred prospective plaintiffs from litigation against relatives or close 
friends on the grounds of fraud or undue influence. "Mistake" does not 
carry the negative implication of "fraud". 
Pfeifer, it should be noted, also affirmed the probate court's 
disallowance of counsel fees to the defendant Foundation. 60 The Founda-
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 589, 402 N.E.2d at 95. 
" Id. at 589-90, 402 N.E.2d at 95-96. 
" ld. at 589, 402 N.E.2d at 96. 
" Id. at 589-90, 402 N.E.2d at 96. 
•• Id. 
" Id. at 590, 402 N.E.2d at 96. 
" See Webster v. Kelly, 274 Mass. 564, 571, 175 N.E. 69, 71 (1931). 
" See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1767, 1768, 402 N.E.2d 
1322, 1323. 
" In Bruno v. Bruno, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1959, 411 N.E.2d 1324, decided in a 
rescript during the Survey year, the Appeals Court refused to void a deed between relatives 
where there was no showing of a peculiar relationship of trust and confidence. Id. at 1960, 411 
N.E.2d at 1326. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 333 (1959). 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 593, 402 N.E.2d at 97-98. 10
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tion argued that it should have been awarded counsel fees under section 39B 
of chapter 215 of the General Laws, 61 which allows the probate court discre-
tion to award fees in matters involving interpretation of an instrument or 
fiduciary's duties. 62 The trust problem was, according to the court, caused 
by Sidney's misconduct, and because the Foundation was Sidney's suc-
cessor in interest, it was chargeable with Sidney's culpability. 63 In such a 
case, the court found, the probate court could properly disallow fees. 64 
In addition to the direct implications of Pfeifer, a matter of equal con-
cern to attorneys, [not addressed by Pfeifer], is the related ethical problem 
associated with attorney involvement in matters of this sort, especially in 
estate planning. The rules of professional conduct applicable to 
Massachusetts attorneys raise direct ethical concerns for attorneys prepar-
ing legal instruments for clients which even modestly benefit the attorney, 65 
except at best in "exceptional circumstances. " 66 Pfeifer adds to this concern 
as the indirect benefit considered there falls within the sweep of the ethical 
problem. The trend has been toward more restrictive limits on interested at-
torney involvement even in "friend or family" cases. 67 Indeed, the pro-
posed ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a draftsman 
from.accepting any gift, except where the client and attorney are relatives. 61 
The thrust of Pfeifer and these developing ethical trends suggest that 
an attorney in Massachusetts should, at least in non-family situations, 
decline any gift beyond a token remembrance in a legal instrument he is 
preparing. If the client insists on making the gift, another attorney should 
be asked to prepare the instrument. Pfeifer and its predecessors indicate 
that the instrument will be open to attack for rescission, especially if the 
client decides later to change his mind, on the simple grounds that ample ex-
planations were not given as to the legal effect. Such instruments will also 
be easy prey to attack by disgruntled heirs. Moreover, under emerging 
ethical norms, the attorney opens himself up to disciplinary inquiry. 
Practitioners might also note that Pfeifer contains a veritable treatise 
of Massachusetts case law on the interrelationship between fiduciary 
responsibility and the inducement of execution of an instrument, to be com-
mended to anyone concerned with the responsibilities of an attorney or 
other de facto or de jure fiduciary to those relying on him for advice . 
., M.G.L. c.215, § 39B. 
62 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 591-92, 402 N.E.2d at 97 . 
., Id. at 592-93,402 N.E.2d at 97. 
•• Id., 402 N.E.2d at 97-98. See also Chase v. Pevear, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 905, 926-30,419 
N.E.2d 1358, 1370-72 . 
., S.J.C. R. 3:07, CANNON 5, DR 5-IOI(A). 
•• ABA Ethical Consideration 5-5. For a discussion of the "exceptional circumstance" rule, 
see ABA CoMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINION No. 1145 
(1970) (involving an attorney preparing a will for his spouse). For an extensive discussion ofthe 
ethical problem, see State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963). 
67 State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963); INFORMAL OPINION No. 1145, 
supra note 66. 
01 ABA COMM. ON EvALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFES· 
SJONAL CONDUCf (PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, May 30, 1981), Rule 1.8(c). 11
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§ 7.3 Trusts and Wills - Interrelated Instruments Interpreted Together 
- Discretion of Trustees to make Payments to Estate. During the Survey 
year, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit advanced the 
developing concept in Massachusetts law that interprets fiduciaries' discre-
tionary powers to achieve desired tax consequences. In State Street Bank 
and Trust v. United States, • the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts law, 2 
held that an apparently discretionary power of the trustee to transfer prop-
erty to a decedent's estate for payment of charitable legacies under her will 
in fact mandated the transfer of such property where the assets of the estate 
were insufficient for that purpose, where the will and trust were concurrent-
ly executed as part of an integrated plan, and where the decedent had evi-
denced in the will a strong desire that the legacies be paid. 3 Absent such a 
ruling, the charitable deduction would have been lost. 
Under section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,4 an estate is en-
titled to a deduction for the amount of gifts passing from a decedent to or 
for the use of a qualified charity.' The deduction is disallowed, however, if 
the transfer to the charity is dependent "upon the performance of some act 
or the happening of a precedent event in order that it might become effec-
tive ... unless the possibility that the charitable transfer will not become ef-
fective is so remote as to be negligible. " 6 If a charitable transfer is made 
under the discretionary powers of a trustee, therefore, the deduction will be 
disallow~d. 
In State Street the decedent had executed simultaneously a will and a 
revocable trust, naming State Street Bank and Trust Company both co-
executor (with a nephew) of the will and sole trustee of the trust. 7 The will 
made various charitable bequests, and the residue was divided Jlmong 
several relatives. • The trust provided that after the decedent's death, the 
trustee was authorized to pay any debts, expenses or death taxes of the dece-
dent or her estate, and to pay any legacies included in the decedent's will, 
with "absolute discretion," after considering the assets in the estate, to 
determine whether any such items would be paid from the trust.' Mter these 
payments, if any, were made, the trust property was to be divided in the 
same manner as provided in the residuary clasue of the will. 10 By the time of 
§ 7:3 1 634 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1980). 
• As a general rule, state law defines rights and obligations inuring to taxpayers in various 
transactions, while federal law ascertains the tax implications of those rights and obligations. 
Helveringv.·Stuart, 317 U.S.154, 161-62 (1942); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 
(1940); see Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 462-66 (1967). 
• 634 F.2d at 11. · 
• I~R.,C. § 2055. 
' I.R.C. § 2055 (a) (2). 
• Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b)(1), 10 n.7. 
' 634 F.2d at 7, 10 n.7. 
•-Id. at 7. , 
' Id. at 7-8 • 
.. /d. at 7. 
12
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the decedent's death substantially all of her assets had been transferred to 
the revocable trust so that the probate estate was nearly insolvent, and the 
trustee exercised its authority to pay the charitable legacies of the will from 
the trust assets. 11 
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the charitable deduction for the 
legacies on the ground that at the time of the dececent's death there had 
been more than a negligible possibility that the trustee would not exercise its 
discretion to make the payments, 12 even though the trustee in fact had made 
the payments. The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts upheld the disallowance, 13 but on appeal the First Circuit 
reversed. 14 
The First Circuit noted that the decedent had clearly demonstrated in her 
will that the charitable gifts were of high priority in her estate plan by 
carefully delineating not only the amounts to pass to charity, but also their 
specific purposes. 15 The gifts followed a history of charitable giving by her 
and by her late husband. 16 Because her will and trust must be read together 
to ascertain her intent, the court reasoned, the priority expressed in her will 
must be read into the trust as well to interpret her intentions as to the scope 
of the powers of the trustee. 17 The Court noted favorably an affidavit, filed 
by a former vice-president of the trustee bank, stating that his own inter-
pretation of the discretionary provision was that the trustee only had the 
power to choose between funding the gifts with estate assets or with trust 
assets. 18 Based on these factors, the estate argued, and the Court specifically 
agreed, that a ·professional trustee in Massachusetts under such cir-
cumstances would have an obligation to pay the charitable legacies when the 
estate had insufficient funds, and that a failure to do so would be a breach 
of the trustee's fiduciary duty. 19 In addition, the First Circuit noted that in 
the only other discretionary powers given the trustee, that of making 
payments to the settlor during her lifetime, the trustee was required to ob-
tain prior approval of the settlor's nephew. 20 The Court felt that it was ut-
II /d. 
" ld. at 7-8. 
" State St. Bank & Trust v. United States, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. , 13, 350. 
•• 634F.2dat 11. 
" ld. at 8. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 10. The Court cited Persky v. Hutner, 369 Mass. 7, 336 N.E.2d 865 (1975), as 
authority for this proposition. Persky v. Hutner, however, turned on external manifestations 
of the decedent's intent. /d. at 15-16, 336 N.E.2d at 869-70. The case of First Nat'/ Bank of 
Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of Boston, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1329, 389 N.E.2d 1002, would 
appear, however, to be proper and sufficient authority for the court's logic. See Stewart and 
Babson, Trusts and Estates, 1979 ANN. SURVEY MASS. L., § 3.3 at 51-56. 
" 634 F.2d at 8-9. It is unclear how much weight the Court gave or should have given to 
such an affidavit. 
" /d. at 9. 
•• /d. at 10 n. 7. 
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terly improbable that the decedent intended the trustee to have the actual 
discretion to decide whether charitable legacies would be paid without hav-
ing imposed at least a similar precaution. 21 The Court therefore held that 
the probability of the trustee's not making such payment was remote, and 
that the deduction was improperly disallowed. 22 
The Court's reasoning stems from two lines of Massachusetts authority. 
The first establishes that where a decedent bas an interrelated will and inter-
vivos trust, both will be read together in order to ascertain the intention of 
the decedent with respect to either instrument. 23 
The second is the growing line of Massachusetts cases interpreting will 
and trust powers so as to carry out intentions expressed in the instrument as 
a whole to qualify for favorable tax results apparently contemplated by the 
grantor or testator. Specifically, the court cited Worcester County National 
Bank v. King24 and Woodberry v. Bunker. 25 Worcester County read into an 
apparently unlimited power to allocate receipts or disbursements between 
principal and income a standard requiring only that the fiduciary only use 
informed judgment and good faith in ascertaining proper allocations. 26 
Woodberry interpreted an apparently unlimited power to invade principal 
for "comfortable support, medical or nursing care, or other purposes which 
seem wise to my trustee, " 27 as imposing a requirement that the trustees only 
invade principal to preserve the standard of living to which the beneficiaries 
were accustomed prior to the settlor's death. 28 Both decisions saved an 
otherwise disallowable charitable remainder deduction, and the Court 
similarly saved the deduction in State Street using the same doctrine. 
The trust law logic of State Street cannot rightly be limited either to 
charitable dispositions or to tax motivations. A testator's expressed inten-
tion to carry out objectives or priorities either limits fiduciary powers under 
the will and related trust or not. Non-charitable specific legatees, for exam-
ple, by law, and therefore by implied testator intent, are to have priority at 
least over residuary legatees. 29 Unless State Street is to be limited to its facts, 
its logic might apply as well to discretions in the trust to satisfy such 
legacies, especially where the trust passes to substantially the same 
beneficiaries as the residuary legatees, and especially if the legacies are ac-
companied by expressions of fondness or appreciation for services. Nor 
11 /d. 
11 /d. at ll. 
" See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of Boston, N.A., 1979Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1329, 389 N.E.2d 1002. 
14 359 Mass. 231, 268 N.E.2d 838 (1971). 
15 359 Mass. 239, 268 N.E.2d 841 (1971). 
16 Id. at 233, 268 N.E.2d at 840. 
17 /d. at 240-41, 268 N.E.2d at 842. 
11 /d. at 241, 268 N.E.2d at 843. 
19 2 G. NEWHALL, SETILEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETI'S, § 241 
(4th ed. 1958). 
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should the absence of simultaneous execution really change the result. If a 
will is executed some time after the trust, even perhaps naming different 
charities or other specific legatees, there is no logical reason why such a will 
ought not also impliedly limit the discretions of the trustee where the will 
and trust still fit together as part of a unified plan. 
The logic of State Street arguably could apply as well to a trustee's discre-
tion to pay assets to the estate for payment of debts or administration ex-
penses where the decedent directs in the will that such items be paid. Such 
an interpretation might have relevance for estate tax deductibility, 30 or 
where creditors for one reason or another may not be able to proceed direct-
ly against the trust. 31 Finally, trustees must satisfy debts or expenses where 
the will directs payment, even though the related trust makes such payments 
discretionary, some property otherwise free from estate or inheritance tax 
might be exposed to such taxes as a result. 
While the foregoing might carry State Street beyond its intended effect, 
especially given the peculiar facts of the case, cases such as State Street carry 
a warning. Draftsmen must plainly specify the extent to which trustees have 
the discretion to or are required to pay over property to the estate where any 
prov!sions in that regard are to be inserted in a trust. At a minimum, if the 
payment of legacies or debts and expenses are directed under the will, the 
priority of the decedent must be ascertained at the drafting stage, and the 
trust must make it clear whether or not the trustee is obligated to make 
payments to the estate where the probate assets are insufficient. 
§ 7.4 Standing to Challenge Will, Appointment of Executor and Exemp-
tion from Sureties on Bond- Suitability of Executor. The Massachusetts 
Appeals Court heard two cases during the Survey year involving appeals 
from proceedings for petitions for probate of wills and appointment of ex-
ecutors. In Gay v. Richmond, 1 the court held that a creditor of the testator 
has standing to challenge the appointment of an executor on the basis of 
competency and suitability, and that both a creditor and a legatee have a 
" Certain administrative expenses may be disallowed if, in effect, they exceed the probate 
estate. I.R.C. § 2053 (c) (2). 
" See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 389 N.E.2d 768 (1979), 
which allowed decedent's creditors to reach revocable trust assets after the decedent's death 
but only where the decedent had control over the assets during lifetime. /d. at 638-39, 389 
N .E.2d at 772. Certain assets flowing to such a trust, such as life insurance proceeds, are likely 
immune to the reach of Reiser. See Stewart and Babson, Trusts and Estates, 1979 ANN. SuRVEY 
MASs. L. § 3.1 at 40-47. Combining Reiser with State Street, creditors might argue that the 
trustee must pay assets over to the estate to satisfy their claims because of the direction by the 
decedent to pay debts, which direction takes priority over other dispositions. Cf. First Nat'! 
Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of Boston, N.A., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1329, 389 
N.E.2d 1002 (extrinsic evidence admissible to resolve conflict between will and trust instrument 
regarding liability for payment of estate and inheritance taxes in action by executors of estate 
against trustees). 
§ 7.4 ' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 441, 400 N.E.2d 1325. 
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right to be heard on the question of whether the executor may be exempt 
from sureties on his bond. 2 In Lindsey v. Ogden, 3 the court analyzed the 
factors necessary under Massachusetts law to determine whether the ex-
ecutor named in the will was suitable to serve as such. 4 These two cases pro-
vide some guidelines to the practitioner regarding the procedural and 
substantive issues that may arise in challenges to the suitability of a named 
executor. 
In Gay, the testatrix had named her sister-in-law, Pauline Richmond, ex-
ecutrix and had given her a $5,000 legacy and the residue of her estate. 5 
Mrs. Richmond, a sister-in-law of the testatrix by her first marriage, peti-
tioned the probate court for the probate of the will. 6 Appearances were filed 
by several individuals. 7 Motions to strike these appearances for lack of 
standing were allowed. 8 The court denied a motion to stay the proceedings 
pending appeal and admitted the will to the probate. 9 Richmond was ap-
pointed executrix, without mreties on her bond. 10 Appeals were taken from 
the allowance of the motions to strike. 11 
Before proceeding to the issue of standing of the creditors and legatees, 
the court disposed of the appeal of Mrs. Ruth Gay, the sister-in-law of the 
testatrix by a second marriage. 12 Mrs. Gay based her claim of standing on 
the theory that she was the true sister-in-law of the testatrix and, therefore, 
had been named in the will. 13 She argued that Mrs. Richmond, as the sister 
of the testatrix' first husband, was upon the testatrix' remarriage no longer 
the sister-in-law. 14 The court dealt with this challenge in a perfunctory 
fashion, finding no ambiguity on the face of the will, 15 and agreeing with 
the judge below that Mrs. Gay was "really reaching" in making her claim. 16 
' Id. at 443-45, 400 N.E.2d at 1327-28. 
' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1243, 406 N.E.2d 701. 
4 Id. at 1246-56, 406 N.E.2d at 705-11. 
' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 442, 400 N.E.2d at 1326. 
• /d. at 441-42, 400 N.E.2d at 1326. 
' /d. at 441, 400 N.E.2d at 1326. 
' /d. at 441, 400 N.E.2d at 1326. 
• /d. at 441-2, 400 N.E.2d at 1326. 
'
0 /d. at 442, 400 N.E.2d at 1326. 
II Id. 
" /d., 400 N.E.2d at 1326-27. 
" /d., 400 N.E.2d at 1327. Ordinarily a legatee under a will has no standing to challenge the 
probate of the will as the executor represents the will and legatees. Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Bailey, 202 Mass. 283, 290, 88 N.E. 898, 900 (1909). Where it appears that the adverse interests 
of the legatees warrants a hearing of the different contentions that could be made under the 
will, the court in its discretion may permit the legatee to be heard. /d. Mrs. Gay's daughter, 
who was a legatee, also based a claim for standing on adverse interests of the legatees. 1980 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 443 n.2, 400 N.E.2d at 1327 n.2. The daughter's claim depended 
upon the success of her mother's argued construction of the will. /d. The court rejected,Mrs. 
Gay's contentions; therefore, her daughter's argument failed. /d. 
" /d. at 442, 400 N.E.2d at 1326-27. 
" /d. at 443, 400 N.E.2d at 1327. The absence of any ambiguity on the face of the will 
precluded the introduction of extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning. See Mahoney v. 
Grainger, 283 Mass. 189, 192, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (1930). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 442, 400 N.E.2d at 1327. 16
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The other claims had more merit, however, as they were raised by 
creditors of the testatrix. 17 Because it was of no concern to the creditors 
whether the decedent died testate or intestate, the court observed they had 
no standing to challenge the allowance of the will. 18 As creditors, however, 
they did have standing to challenge the appointment of the executor and 
could raise questions concerning the executor's competence and 
suitability. 19 In this case, however, the creditors' claims of potential con-
flicts of interest on the part of Mrs. Richmond were not sufficient, if 
proved, to reject the appointment at the named executrix. 20 
On the question whether the executrix could be exempt from giving a 
surety on her bond, the court concluded that both the creditors and the 
legatee, so long as the legacy had not yet been paid, 21 had the right to be 
heard. 22 Because they had not been given this opportunity, the court 
vacated the motions to strike and allowed motions to be made in the pro-
bate court on the limited issue of exemption from sureties. 23 The probate of 
the will and the appointment of the executrix still stood. 
Gay apparently is the first reported case where the court has recognized 
specifically the standing of a creditor to challenge the competence and 
suitability of the executor. 24 Furthermore, although there is specific 
statutory authority which grants a creditor of the testator an opportunity to 
"show cause" why an executor ought not to be exempt from sureties on the 
bond, 2s this decision seems also to be the first to give the same right to a 
legatee whose legacy has not yet been paid. The Gay opinion therefore ex-
pands the class of those who have standing to challenge the appointment of 
an executor. 
The court dealt with the substantive issue of the suitability of an executor 
in Lindsey v. Ogden. 26 In that case, the son of the testatrix27 filed objections 
" The creditors were the heirs of the testatrix's husband. Id. at 443, 400 N.E.2d at 1327. 
Their claims were based in tort and contract, on the ground that the testatrix had failed to be-
queath them property from her husband's estate./d. The court apparently was concerned that 
the judge below may have relied on Marcus v. Pearce Woolen Mills, Inc., 353 Mass. 483, 233 
N .E.2d 29 (1968), for authority to strike the appearances of the creditors of the testatrix. That 
case, however, held only that creditors of an heir have no standing unless they are attaching 
creditors. /d. at 485-86, 233 N.E.2d at 30; see Smith v. Bradstreet, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 264, 
265-66'(1834). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 443, 400 N.E.2d at 1327. The theory behind the prohibi-
tion of standing to challenge the allowance of a will is that the creditor wiH take before the next 
of kin or heirs if there is an intestacy or before the legatees or devisees if there is a will. Monroe 
v. Cooper, 235 Mass. 33, 34-35, 126 N.E. 286, 287 (1920). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 443-44, 400 N.E.2d at1327. 
" Id. at 444, 400 N.E.2d at 1327-28. 
" ld. at 444 n.4, 400 N.E.2d at 1328 n.4. 
" Id. at 444, 400 N.E.2d at 1328. 
2
' Id. at 445, 400 N.E.2d at 1328. 
24 See 1 G. NEWHALL, SETILEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 41 
(4th ed. 1958). 
, G.L. c. 205, § 4. 
2
' 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1243, 406 N.E.2d 701. 
27 The son had standing as an heir to object to the allowance of the will. Taylor v. Whittier, 17
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to the allowance of the will and to the appointment of the testatrix' at-
torney, who had bee.n named in the will as executor. 21 By the agreement of 
all interested parties, the attorney was appointed special administrator. 29 
The son then petitioned the court for his removal. 30 The court denied the 
petition, admitted the will to probate and appointed the attorney executor 
of the will. 31 The son appealed both the appointment of the attorney as ex-
~cutor, and his continuation as special administrator, to the Appeals 
Court. 32 
Under section 4 of chapter 192 of the General Laws, the probate court 
will appoint the individual named in the will as executor upon four condi-
tions. 33 The individual must accept the office and post bond within thirty 
days of the allowance of the will. 34 The individual must be legally competent 
and finally, the individual must be "suitable."35 The requirement of 
"suitability" has generated a number of cases. 36 The 'suitable' executor has 
been defined as follows: 
a fitting person having regard to the special conditions of each estate 
and those interested in it as creditors, legatees, and next of kin. 
Suitableness is capacity founded on the innate and acquired qualities 
of the particular person in his relation to the situation of the estate to 
be administered, and to those directly and indirectly to be affected by 
the settlement of the estate. Attention may be given to personal 
characteristics and to all the other causes, not easily susceptible of 
enumeration, rationally affecting a judicious selection. 37 
As the quotation indicates, the criterion of suitability incorporates a wide 
range of factors. 
240 Mass. 514, 138 N .E. 6 (1922). He was also a beneficiary of the trust to which the residue of 
the estate passed. See 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1247 n.4, 406 N.E.2d at 706. As such, 
he might also have had standing to object to the allowance of the will. Cf Azarian v. The First 
Nat. Bank of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1066, 1068 (beneficiaries of trust to which residue 
of eState passed entitled to object to allowance of executor's accounts under certain cir-
cumstances). Lindsey does not disclose whether the son was a direct legatee under the will. If 
so, under certain circumstances, he might have been able to object to the allowance of the will. 
See Conley v. Fenelon, 266 Mass. 340, 344, 165 N.E. 382, 384 (1929). 
" 1980 Mass. ~pp. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1243, 406 N.E.2d at 704. 
" Id. 
•• /d. at 1244, 406 N.E.2d at 704. 
" /d. at 1244, 406 N.E.2d at 704. 
" /d. at 1244, 406 N.E.2d at 704. 
" G.L. c. 192, § 4. 
,. /d. See, e.g., Atherton v. FitzGibbon, 346 Mass. 384, 386, 192 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1963). 
" G.L. c. 192, § 4. 
" See cases cited in 1 G. NEWHALL, SETILEMENT OF ESTAlES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN 
MASSACHUSETTS § 46 (4th ed. 1958). 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1246-47,406 N.E.2d at 706, (quoting Davis, petitioner, 
237 Mass. 47, 49-50, 129 N.E. 366, 366-67 (1921)). Cf Quincy Trust Co. v. Taylor, 317 Mass. 
195, 196-97, 57 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1944). (factors supporting removal of an executor as ''un-
suitable" under G.L. c. 195, § 11). 
18
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Even though similar qualities determine suitability whether the fiduciary 
seeking appointment is an executor or administrator, 31 the probate court 
has less discretion when considering the suitability of a named executor. As 
the choice of the testator, one commentator has noted, the named executor 
has "a better prima facie standing than one upon whom the law accidentally 
casts the right to be appointed administrator." 39 
The Supreme Judicial Court explains this distinction as a result of the dif-
ference between applying the suitability standard to one individual, named 
in the will, and applying ·it on a comparative basis to a number of in-
dividuals who could serve as administrators. 40 
In Lindsey, the court underscored the importance of this role of discre-
tion in the suitability issue. T~e court pointed out that because a testator is 
entitled to have his estate administered by the person whom he selected, 
there must be a "pretty strong objection" to refuse the appointmenV 1 The 
court reviewed several challenges to the appointment of the named executor 
and denied them all. 42 In Lindsey, the son first had been represented by the 
attorney-executor who upon undertaking the representation of the dece-
dent, terminated the attorney-client relationship with the son. 43 Several of 
the son's objections appeared to be based on this earlier relationship. 
The first point was based on the allegation that the estate plan prepared 
by _the attorney-executor resulted in uncontemplated adverse tax conse-
quences to the son and in other ways did not serve the son's interests. 44 The 
court found that the estate plan was in keeping with the decedent's direc-
tions, that it had her informed approval, and that it was "farfetched" to 
suggest that the attorney was unsuitable because he recommended amend-
ing the decedent's estate plan. 45 The use of information gained from the at-
torney's earlier representation of the son served as the basis of two other 
contentions. In one, the son claimed the attorney had undermined the son's 
relationship with the decedent. 46 The court concluded that this was not the 
" See Grossman v. Grossman, 343 Mass. 565, 568, 179 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1962) (executor); 
Morgan v. Morgan, 267 Mass. 388, 393, 166 N.E. 747, 749 (1929) (administrator); Davis, peti-
tioner, 237 Mass. 47, 49-50, 129 N.E. 366, 366-67 (1921) (administrator d.b.n. c.t.a.). 
" 1 G. NEWHALL,SETILEMENTOFESTATESANDFIDUCIARYLAWINMASSACHUSETIS § 47, at 
172 (4th ed. 1958). 
•• Grossman v. Grossman, 343 Mass. 565, 568, 179 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1962). 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1247, 406 N.E.2d at 706, (quoting Newhall,§ 46 at 164 
(4th ed. 1958)). For cases where the named executor was not appointed, see Osborne v. Craig, 
251 Mass. 169, 146 N.E. 263 (1925); Cogswell v. Hall, 183 Mass. 575, 67 N.E. 638 (1903) . 
., 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1247-56,406 N.E.2d at 706-11. 
., /d. at 1245-46, 406 N.E.2d at 705. 
•• /d. at 1247-48, 406 N.E.2d at 706 . 
., /d. at 1248, 406 N.E.2d at 707. 
" /d. at 1248-49, 406 N.E.2d at 707. For cases involving hostility between the fiduciary and 
beneficiary, see Cefalo v. Cefalo, 359 Mass. 756, 757, 270 N.E.2d 405, 406 (1971); Colbert v. 
Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131, 143-47, 217 N.E.2d 914, 922-25 (1966); See also Grossman v. 
Grossman, 343 Mass. 565, 569, 179 N.E.2d 900, 903 (1962). 
19
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case. 47 In the other charge, the son claimed that the attorney had "switched 
sides" and used confidential information about the son in preparation of 
the decedent's estate plan. 48 Observing that it was not unusual to have the 
same attorney represent the beneficiaries and the testatrix, the court held 
that there was no evidence that the attorney-client relationship had been 
breached. 49 The court specifically found that because of the probate court's 
authority to supervise fiduciary activity, there was no merit to the claim that 
a conflict would occur in having one attorney serve in the capacities of 
special administrator, executor and trustee. so 
An allegation that the attorney was engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law was dismissed as frivolous. 51 The court gave serious attention, 
however, to the claim of a "deficiency in character and credibility" based 
on the attorney's handling of a particular matter for a corporation with 
operations in Chile. 52 The attorney had appeared before the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, which was investigating the corporation for possi-
ble illegal payments. 53 The probate court had determined that the attorney 
had never been cited for improper conduct by any agency of the United 
States, of the Chilean government or by any bar association, and that his 
role failed to demonstrate "present unsuitability to serve as executor. " 54 
The Appeals Court upheld the finding. ss 
Finally, the son challenged the attorney's handling of certain Swiss bank 
accounts on the grounds that the son should have been made aware of their 
existence at an earlier time so that he could have instituted litigation to pro-
tect the decedent's estate and to determine ownership of the accounts. 56 The 
court dismissed this claim, upholding the probate court's determination 
that no purposeful concealment had occurred and that a proper investiga-
tion into ownership had occurred. 57 The Appeals Court also stated that the 
47 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1249, 406 N.E.2d at 707 . 
•• /d. 
•• /d. at 1249, 406 N.E.2d at 707. Conflicts of interest between the executor in his fiduciary 
capacity and in his individual capacity may be sufficient reason not to appoint a named ex-
ecutor, Cogswell v. Hall, 183 Mass. 575, 67 N.E. 638 (1903), or to remove the individual as ex-
ecutor, Quincy Trust Co. v. Taylor, 317 Mass. 195, 197, 57 N.E.2d 573 (1944); Putney v. 
Fletcher, 148 Mass. 247-48, 19 N.E. 370 (1889). 
•• 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1249-50, 406 N.E.2d at 707-08. Both the special ad-
ministrator and the executor have an affirmative duty to account to the probate court. G.L. c. 
206, § 1. No such obligation is imposed upon the trustee of an inter vivos trust, but the probate 
court may hear matters involving such trusts under its equity jurisdiction. G.L. c. 215, § 6. 
" 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1250, 406 N.E.2d at 708. 
" Id. at 1251-52, 406 N.E.2d at 708-09. 
" /d. at 1251, 406 N.E.2d at 708. 
•• Id. at 1252, 406 N.E,2d at 709. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 1252-53, 406 N.E.2d at 709. 
" Id. at 1254, 406 N.E.2d at 709-10. The issue of concealment "was also implicated" in the 
claim against the attoQiey for his refusal to turn over his notations and other "work product" 
involved in analyzing the Swiss bank accounts. Id. at 1254-56, 406 N.E.2dat 710-11. 
20
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son could either institute separate proceedings on this issue or it could 
challenge the attorney's account as special administrator. ss 
The lengthy discussion in Lindsey concerning various challenges to the 
suitability of the attorney to serve as executor underscores the difficulty a 
claimant has in sustaining a challenge to the appointment of an executor 
who has been named in the will. The probate court's discretion in the matter 
is relatively narrow. Lindsey suggests that only relatively egregious conduct 
may be held to overrule a testator's choice. 
§ 7.5 Beneficiaries' Power over Trust Principal - Limited Interests -
Classification as General Powers of Appointment. During the Survey 
year, Massachusetts law governing the scope of powers which a beneficiary 
has over trust property survived two efforts by the Internal Revenue Service 
to classify such powers as general powers of appointment for estate tax pur-
poses. In Garfield v. United States, 1 The United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts held that a decedent who was beneficiary and 
co-trustee of a trust did not, under Massachusetts law, have the right to par-
ticipate in distribution decisions beneficially affecting himself. 2 He, 
therefore, did not possess a general power of appointment over the trust 
property for federal estate tax purposes. 3 In Brantingham v. United States, 4 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered a 
testamentary trust created by a Massachusetts decedent, that gave a 
beneficiary the power to invade corpus as she might deem necessary for her 
"maintenance, comfort and happiness." 5 The court held that the power 
was limited, under Massachusetts law, by a standard sufficiently ascer-
tainable to preclude the power from being characterized in the beneficiary's 
estate as a general power of appointment. 6 
Under section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 7 the federal 
gross estate of a decedent includes the value of all property ·over which the 
decedent has at the time of his death a general power of appointment. 8 The 
" /d. at 1254, 406 N.E.2d at 710. Presumably the son could also challenge the first 
executor's account on the theory that the executor should have gone against the special ad-
ministrator to collect all the assets. See Brackett v. Fuller, 279 Mass. 62, 180 N.E. 664 (1932); 3 
G. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETI'S, § 470 (4th ed. 
1958). 
§7.5 ' 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) , 13,381, at 85,891 (D. Mass. 1980). 
1 /d. at 85,893. 
'/d. 
• 631 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1980). 
' /d. at 543. 
• /d. at 547. 
7 I.R.C. § 2041 (1976). 
• The power must be created after October 21, 1942. I.R.C. § 204I(a)(2). Property is also 
includible where such powers have been released in certain ways. /d. Powers created on or 
before October 21, 1942 generally must be exercised before the property is includible. I.R.C. § 
204l(a)(l). 
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Code defines a general power of appointment as a power which is exer-
cisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of 
his estate.' One exception to this definition is a power to consume, invade, 
or appropriate property for the benefit of the decedent which is limited by 
an "ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support or 
ntaintenance of the decedent." 10 
Garfield and Brantingham address separately two basic tests for a general 
power of appointment. Garfield considers whether the power of appoint-
ment was actually held by the decedent; 11 Brantingham considers whether 
the power was limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, 
education, support or maintenance of the decedent. u These issues depend 
on state law, not on federallaw. 13 In both cases, the courts relied principally 
on the 1977 case of Dana v. Gring, 14 an important Supreme Judicial Court 
decision which addressed both issues. 
In Dana v. Gring, the Supreme Judicial Court determined whether cer-
tain property should be included in a trust beneficiary's gross estate for 
federal tax purposes. 15 One of the trustees, the decedent's daughter, was 
also the principal beneficiary of the trust. 16 The terms of the trust instru-
ment regarding powers to distribute principal included the following provi-
sion: 
I further authorize my Trustees at any time that my said daughter 
may request, or without such request when the other Trustees may 
deem it advisable, to pay over to her from time to time such amounts 
of the principal for her own use as said Trustees may deem necessary 
or desirable for the purpose of contributing to the reasonable welfare 
or happiness of my said daughter or of her immediate family. 17 
Estate tax liability depended in part upon whether this language permit-
ted the beneficiary to control the distribution of trust principal to herself. 18 
The Court relied on the general rule that absent an expressed contrary intent 
in the inst~;ument, a trustee-beneficiary normally may not participate in 
decisions regarding distributions of principal to herself. 19 Consistency with 
• I.R.C. § 2041(a)(1). 
10 LR.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A). 
" 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas., at 85,893. 
" 631 F.2d at 547. 
" Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 162 (1942); see Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 
U.S. 456,462-66 (1%7). The domicile of the decedent at death would be the appropriate state's 
law to apply, in the absence of a designation by the testator of some other state. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICI'S OF LAW§§ 268, 271 (1971). 
14 374 Mass. 109, 371 N.E.2d 755 (1977). See Hern, Trusts and Estates, 1977 ANN. SuRv. 
MASS. LAW,§ 10.8 at 236-38. 
" 374 Mass. 109, 110, 371 N.E.2d 755, 756. 
16 Id. at 112, 371 N.E.2d at 757. 
" ld. at 111 n.2, 371 N.E.2d at 756 n.2. 
" Id. at 115-16, 371 N.E.2d at 759. 
" ld. at 118-19, 371 N.E.2d at 761 (citing G. BooERTTRUSTS § 129 (2d ed. 1965)). 
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this principle favored interpreting the references to "other Trustees" and 
"said Trustees" in the distribution power as excluding the beneficiary from 
such decisions. 20 The Court concluded, as a factual matter, that the 
distribution power expressed no contrary intent, and therefore held that the 
beneficiary could not participate in decisions regarding the distribution of 
principal to herself. 21 
The second major factor determining tax liability in Dana v. Gring was 
whether the ''reasonable welfare or happiness'' language in the trust instru-
ment created a limited standard relating to health, education, support or 
maintenance, or an effectively unlimited standard dependent on subjective 
desires. 22 The Court held that the word "happiness" had to be viewed in the 
context of the entire trust instrument, which revealed a clear concern for 
preserving the trust fund for the settlor's issue. 23 The indications the Court 
relied upon were the limitation of the class o.f eligible appointees to issue, 
the naming of issue as takers in default of appointment, and a spendthrift 
clause. 24 With the power of distribution so viewed, the trustees could not 
distribute trust principal to the life beneficiary by reason of her subjective 
desires alone. 2 ' Rather, the trustees' discretion was limited to the amounts 
necessary to maintain the life beneficiary according to her standard of living 
before she became a beneficiary of the trust. 26 The Court concluded, 
therefore, that the power to invade principal was restricted by an objective 
and ascertainable standard. 27 
Garfield and Brantingham dealt separately with both aspects of Dana v. 
Gring. In Garfield, a settlor created a trust for the benefit of the decedent 
and his issue during the decedent's lifetime, with the decedent and an in-
dependent third party as trustees. 28 The trust in pertinent part stated: 
During the lifetime of [the decedent], the trustees shall make such 
payments from the income or principal of [the trust fund] as they may 
in their discretion deem advisable to the said [decedent] or such of his 
issue as may from time to time be living. At all times one of the 
trustees shall be an independent person having no interest in this trust 
fund. 29 
The Internal Revenue Service included the trust property in decedent's gross 
estate as general power of appointment property and assessed an additional 
20 374 Mass. at ll9, 371 N.E.2d at 761. 
21 /d. 
" !d. at ll6, 371 N.E.2d at 759. 
" /d. at ll7, 371 N.E.2d at 760. 
24 /d. 
" !d. at ll7-18, 371 N.E.2d at 760. 
" /d. at 118, 371 N.E.2d at 761 (citing Woodberry v. Bunker, 359 Mass. 239, 268 N.E.2d 
841 (1971)). 
" 374 Mass. at 120, 371 N.E.2d at 761. 
" 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,891-92. 
" /d. at 85,892. 
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tax. 30 The decedent's executor paid the tax, filed a refund claim which was 
denied, and then filed suit for a refund in the district court. 31 The key issue 
was whether the decedent, as trustee-beneficiary, had the power at his death 
to pay principal to himself. If he did, under prevailing state law, he would 
have a general power of appointment. 32 Consequently, under federal law, 
the power would properly be included in the gross estate for federal tax pur-
poses. 33 
The Court cited Dana v. Gring as controlling whether the trustee-
beneficiary could participate in decisions concerning distribution of prin-
cipal to himself. 34 The Court interpreted Dana v. Gring as requiring a clear 
provision in the trust instrument permitting the participation of the 
beneficiary-trustee in decisions affecting distributions to himself. 35 Absent 
such a clear provision, such participation was prohibited. 36 Although the in-
strument at issue in Garfield directed the "trustees" to make payments to 
the decedent, the instrument also provided that one trustee must at all times 
be a disinterested person. 37 The Court concluded that the trust's require-
ment that a disinterested person always serve as trustee was far more signifi-
cant that the use of the generic plural "trustees. " 38 Furthermore, the Court 
observed, the disinterested trustee requirement connoted an intention to 
secure favorable tax consequences which would be obviated if the 
beneficiary could participate. 39 The Court, therefore, held that under con-
30 /d. 
31 /d. 
" l.R.C. § 2041 was intended to exclude powers held only in a fiduciary capacity. See 
Security-Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 40, 45 (W.O. Pa. 1965). Such 
powers have not, however, traditionally been excluded where the fiduciary and the beneficiary 
were the same person, absent a limitation by an ascertainable standard relating to health, 
education, support or maintenance. See, e.g., Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d. 234 (3d Cir. 1964). 
The Court in Garfield chose not to decide the question whether the language "as they may in 
their discretion deem advisable" would be such an ascertainable standard. 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
at 85,893. The Court did note, however, the difference between this wording and the kinds of 
language, referring to the maintenance or support of the beneficiary, usually relied upon in the 
cases to support a finding of such a standard. /d. For an illustration of the current trend of 
Massachusetts law determining whether powers of appointment are limited by an ascertainable 
standard, see Brantingham v. United States, 631 F.2d. 542, 546 (7th Cir. 1980) ("any interest 
to which the decedent places limitations on the spouse's power of appointment is considered by 
[Massachusetts] courts as a limited interest"). 
" See text and notes at notes 7-10 supra. 
34 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,892. A general power of appointment held by the decedent in 
conjunction with another is taxable unless the co-holder is the creator or a person having a 
substantial adverse inte.rest in the property. l.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(C). · 
" 80-2 U.S. Tax C~. at 85,893. . 
"ld. 
" /d. at 85,892. 
" /d. at 85,893. 
" /d. (citi~ Berman v. ~dler, 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. 113, 399N.E.2d 17) (reformation of a 
trust allowed where a scrivener's error in amending the trust had inadvertently caused to be 
stricken some but not all necessary marital deduction language); P~tan v. Pastan, 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1342, 390 N.E.2d 253 (limitations in trust~· powers found in order to save a marital 
deduction); and Dana v. Gring:; 374 Mass. 109, 371 N.E.2d 755 (1977) (ascertainable standard 
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trolling Massachusetts law, the decedent was not permitted to participate in 
distribution decisions involving himself and could not be deemed to have a 
general power of appointment. 40 
Although Garfield does not appear to add any particular insight into 
Massachusetts law, cases such as Garfield could have practical conse-
quences beyond favorable tax results. There may be reasons why a settlor 
might want certain persons to participate in decisions or might want more 
than one person to participate in certain decisions. Tax cases such as Gar-
field will frustrate these desires if draftsmen do not specify in instruments 
whether an "interested" trustee is precluded from participating in certain 
kinds of decisions. Such decisions are not limited to distribution decisions, 
but would include boilerplate powers such as lending, allocation of receipts 
between income and principal, using income or principal for the purchase 
of life insurance on the life of the beneficiary-trustee, or election of benefits 
under retirement or other benefit plans. Thus, it is incumbent upon the 
draftsman to explain those limitations to the settlor and to explain the im-
portance of such limitations on the beneficiary's participation. What could 
be a useful tax result in one trust could be entirely adverse to a grantor's 
desires in another. 
Brantingham v. United States4 1 involves the more interesting aspect of 
Dana v. Gring: whether a decedent who admittedly holds a power to invade 
principal is nonetheless limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the 
health, education, support or maintenance of the decedent. Brantingham 
involved not a trust, but a life estate in property, although the same tax 
standards apply. 42 The decedent's husband, who died a resident of 
Massachusetts, had left his property as follows: 
I hereby give, devise, and bequeath unto my children, share and share 
alike, per stirpes, all of my property and estate of whatsoever kind or 
nature, now or hereafter acquired, subject, however, to the life use 
thereof, which I hereby give unto my wife [the decedent] and as such 
life user, my said wife shall have and is hereby given the uncontrolled 
right, power and authority to use and devote such of the corpus 
thereof from time to time as in her judgment is necessary for her 
maintenance, comfort and happiness. 43 
The Internal Revenue Service determined that the value of the property re-
maining at the decedent's death should be included in her estate for federal 
estate tax purposes because her power to invade corpus was a general power 
found in j>ower to Invade principal for beneficiary's reasonable welfare or happiness)). See also 
cast:S cited in Stewart and B~bson, Trusts and Estates 1979 ANN. SuRV. MASS. LAw§ 3.3, at 
51-56. 
•• 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,893. 
•• 631 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1980). 
42 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(l)(A). 
•• 631 F.2d at 543. 
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of appointment. 44 The government's position was upheld by the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the executor 
appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 45 
The taxpayer's arguments in Brantingham were based on the govern-
ment's previous actions regarding the property. Upon the death of the dece-
dent's husband, the government had disallowed the marital deduction for 
the same power of appointment on the grounds that the surviving spouse 
did not have an unlimited power of appointment. 46 According to the tax-
payer, the Internal Revenue Code sections governing the marital deduction 
and general powers of appointment must be read interdependently.47 'Alter-
natively, the taxpayer argued, the government was estopped from asserting 
the tax in second estate given the government's position in the first estate. 48 
The Court summarily rejected both arguments. 49 
Although the taxpayer did not argue on appeal that the decedent's power 
was limited by an ascertainable standard, 50 the Court noted a footnote in 
the government's brief which mentioned the exception, analyzed that issue, 
and found in favor of the taxpayer on that basis. 51 
The government's footnote essentially argued that the inclusion of the 
word "happiness" in the power went beyond the statutory limitation of 
health, education, support or maintenance, and that the word connotes a 
highly subjective standard. 52 The Court disagreed, looking to old 
"ld. at 544. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 543. 
47 /d. 
" /d. at 544-45. 
•• /d. at 545. The interdependency argument wa~ rejected pdmarily because there was no 
evidence of legislative intent to interpret the two sections hand in hand. /d. The court rejected 
the estoppel argument on the basis of lack of evidence of reliance on the government's previous 
action. /d. 
The taxpayer's position is difficult to support. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) provides a specific excep-
tion to the rule denying the marital deduction in the case of certain terminable interests if the 
surviving spouse is absolutely entitled to all of the income and has the power during lifetime or 
at death to appoint the entire interest to the spouse or the spouse's estate, which power is "ex-
ercisable by such spouse alone and in all events." I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1976). The purpose of 
§ 2056(b)(5) is to allow qualification for the marital deduction of a practical equivalent of 
outright ownership where non-tax practical interests might argue for managed or non-probate 
dispositions. See 4 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1521 (4th ed. 1980). Any limits on the ability 
to exercise the power will cause loss of the deduction. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)(5)(g). I.R.C. 
§ 2041 includes in the decedent's estate any property over which the decedent has any power to 
benefit himself, which power is held alone or with others not having an adverse interest, unless 
the power is limited by the specified kind of ascertainable standard .• I.R.C. § 2041; see text and 
notes at notes 7-10 supra. While the taxpayer's argument has some equitable appeal, the 
statutory language simply does not support a finding that any power too limited to meet an "in 
all events" test under section 2056 is by definition limited enough to be a "health, education, 
support or maintena11ce" standard for§ 2041 purposes. 
,. 631 F.2d at 545. 
" Id. & n.3. 
" See 631 F.2d at 547. The government's position had specific support in the tax regula-
tions, which provide that "[a] power to use property for the comfort, welfare, or happiness of 
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Massachusetts case lawH and to the more recent decisions of Woodberry v. 
Bunker54 and Dana v Gring. 55 This review revealed to the Court "that any 
interest to which the decedent places limitations on the spouse's power of 
appointment is considered by the [Massachusetts) courts as a limited in-
terest. " 56 
Relying primarily on Dana v. Gring, 57 the court inspected the decedent's 
will in Brantingham and found an intention to preserve the principal of the 
estate for the decedent's children. 58 Indeed, the will made a gift to the 
children, providing for only a life estate in the widow. 59 The context in 
which the power existed was, in the Court's view, indistinguishable from 
that in Dana v. Gring, and it accordingly held that there was "no doubt" 
that the ascertainable standard exception to the general power of appoint-
ment rule would apply to such language. 60 As a result, the Court held that 
the corpus of the life estate was erroneously included in the life beneficiary's 
gross estate. 61 
Brantingham may represent the government's last attempt to distinguish, 
for federal estate tax purposes, the "happiness" standard under 
Massachusetts law from the "ascertainable" standard under section 2041. 62 
In Br.antingham, the federal government could not prevail on this argument 
in a non-Massachusetts federal court, with a regulation directly on point, 
the holder of the power is not limited by the requisite standard." Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2). 
See Merchants Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943) which held that a 
happiness standard, coupled with language requesting liberal application of the trustee's 
discretion in favor of the life beneficiary, was too subjective to qualify as an ascertainable 
standard. /d. at 263. 
" Examples of older cases holding that broadly drafted clauses created only limited interests 
under Massachusetts law include: Nunes v. Rogers, 307 Mass. 438, 439, 30 N.E.2d 259, 260 
(1940) ("with power to sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of so much of ... [the) estate as in 
her judgment shall be necessary for her comfortable support and maintenance"); Romans v. 
Foster, 232 Mass. 4, 5-6, 121 N.E. 417,418 (1919) ("with the full power to dispose of the whole 
or any part of said property by deed or otherwise if he may deem it conducive to his comfort so 
to do"). The Court found that the precedent of Dana v. Dana, 185 Mass. 156, 157,70 N.E. 49, 
50 (1904) ("power ... to sell and dispose of any or all of [the principal] at her pleasure and 
discretion ... for her own comfort and happiness without accountability to any person whom-
soever" held a general power of appointment) had "not been adhered to" by the 
Massachusetts cases. 631 F.2d at 546-47. The Court also discussed Pittsfield Nat'! Bank v. 
United States, 181 F. Supp. 851 (D. Mass. 1960), where a decedent had the right to "all or such 
part of the principal of same as he may from time to time request, he to be the sole judge of his 
needs." 181 F. Supp. at 852. The district court in that case had found an ascertainable stand-
ard based on the word "needs." See /d. at 854. 
" 359 Mass. 239, 268 N.E.2d 841 (1971). 
" 374 Mass. 109, 371 N.E.2d 755 (1977). 
" 631 F .2d at 546. 
" 374 Mass. 109, 371 N.E.2d 755 (1977). See text and notes at notes 15-27 supra. 




" I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A). See text and notes at notes 7-10, supra. 
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against a taxpayer who did not even actively contest the issue on appeal. 63 
The Brantingham court did not address the validity of regulation section 
20.2041-l(c)(2) which specifically disallows the "happiness" standard. 64 
Although cases such as Morgan v. Commissioner6 ' and He/vering v. 
Stuart66 hold that in tax cases state law governs as to what rights exist and 
federal law governs the taxability of such rights as so defined, 67 none have 
invalidated otherwise properly adopted regulations. It might be argued that 
the regulation, as applied to Massachusetts estates and trusts, is internally 
inconsistent, and that therefore the benefit of the doubt should be given the 
taxpayer. Regulation section 20.2041-1(c) (2) states that "[a] power to use 
property for the comfort, welfare, or happiness of the holder of the power 
is not limited by the requisite standard. " 68 That regulation goes on, 
however, to give as an example of a power which is limited by the requisite 
standard a power of exercisable for the holder's "support in his accustomed 
manner of living."69 Since under cases such as Dana v. Gring, standards 
such as "comfort, welfare or happiness" seem to allow distributions only 
for the preservation of an accustomed manner of living, at least where they 
appear in the context of an expressed concern for preserving corpus for re-
maindermen, 70 the first portion of the regulation might have to yield to the 
second. Absent such logic, Brantingham could be viewed as an expansion of 
the Morgan doctrine that allows state interpretations to overrule properly 
enacted regulations. 
The principles of Brantingham and Dana v. Gring cannot be limited to 
estate tax cases. Their logic applies equally to the income tax consequences 
to the grantor of a trust where he has reserved the power to distribute cor-
pus to an income beneficiary'• or where a non-independent trustee has 
powers to distribute income among beneficiaries. 72 Both powers must be 
limited to a similar acertainable standard to assure income taxation to the 
beneficiary, not to the grantor or trustee. 
Finally, Brantingham and its line of cases carry serious fiduciary limita-
tions on trustees' powers over distributions. Given such interpretations, 
standards such as "comfort, maintenance, support and happiness" cannot 
be included lightly in a trust instrument. Under this developing law, such 
" See text and note at note SO, supra. 
•• Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2). See note 52 supra . 
.. 309 u.s. 78 (1939) . 
.. 317 u.s. 154 (1942). 
" See text and note at note 13, supra . 
.. treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2). 
"Id. 
70 See text and notes at notes 23-26 supra. 
" See Treas. Reg. ~ 1.674(b)-l(b)(S)(iii) which taxes income to the grantor if he has distribu-
tion powers under a "happiness" standard. 
72 See Treas. Reg. § l.674(d)-1, referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-1 for definition of an 
ascertainable standard. · 
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standards may well limit the trustees' ability to make distributions except to 
maintain the previously existing standards of living, at least where the rest 
of the trust instrument indicates a decedent's intent also to preserve the 
fund for the benefit of an issue. Trustees also confront the determination of 
whether sufficient preservation language exists. Most trusts have the kinds 
of items courts have seized upon to find such a preservation intent, such as 
limited powers of appointment, identification of takers in default and 
spendthrift clauses. 73 Where the tax result is not necessary or is subsidiary to 
dispositive desires, the draftsman must assure for trust law purposes that 
the appropriate liberality exists so that appreciating assets may be used to 
increase a beneficiary's standard of living. Most grantors or testators prob-
ably would be surprised to learn that this would not be the case. If the tax 
purposes predominate, the emphasis must be on sufficient language in-
dicating that a primary goal is preservation of the estate for the re-
maindermen. Settlors in the tax-dominated situations must also be made 
aware of the fiduciary limitations which the achievement of favorable tax 
results carry with them. 
§ 7.6 megitimate Children- Rights to Inherit from Father- ''Child'' 
under Social Security Act - Legislation. Under the common law, an il-
legitimate was nullius filius with no rights of inheritance whatsoever. • 
Under Massachusetts laws, however, an illegitimate child historically had a 
statutory right of inheritance from his mother and maternal ancestors, 2 
although common law prohibited inheritance from legitimate siblings or 
collaterals of the mother. 3 Massachusetts began to grant rights of in-
heritance from the father to illegitimates in 18324 and gradually expanded 
those rights5 until1943, when section 7 of chapter 190 was last amended. 6 
After the 1943 amendment, the illegitimate's right of inheritance from his 
" See text and note at note 24 supra. 
§7.6 1 Sanford v. Marsh, 180 Mass. 210, 211, 62 N.E.2d 268, 268 (1902). 
' O.L. c. 190, § 5 (R.L. 133, § 3). 
' See Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430 (1873); Pratt v. Atwood, 108 Mass. 40 (1871). 
An illegitimate child could, however, inherit from his illegitimate siblings. Vallin v. 
Bondesson, 346 Mass. 748, 196 N.E.2d 191 (1964). 
• By the Acts of 1832, c. 147, inheritance was permitted between (1) an illegitimate whose 
parents intermarried and whose father acknowledged the child as his; and (2) the legitimate 
children of the same parents. 
' The statute was amended six times to enlarge rights of illegitimates whose parents inter-
married and whose fathers acknowledged them as their children. R.S. 1836, c. 61, § 4; Acts of 
1853, c. 253; O.S. 1860, c. 91, § 4; P.S. 1882, c. 125, § 5; R.L. 1902, c. 133, § 5; Acts of 1925, 
c. 281, §3. For example, in 1836, an illegitimate was first granted the possibility of inheriting 
from his father. R.S. 1836, c. 61, § 4. Then, by the Acts of 1853, an illegitimate was con-
sidered, after intermarriage and acknowledgment, legitimate for all purposes. Acts of 1853, c. 
253. See.Monson v. Palmer, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 551, 553-55 (1864). 
• Acts of 1943, c. 72, § 1, added to chapter 190 the provision for acknowledgment of an il-
legitimate through a paternity proceeding under O.L. c. 273. Section 7 was substantially re-
vised later in the Survey year. See discussion at note 51 infra. 
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father and his paternal ancestors or collaterals was restricted to situations 
when the father had married the illegitimate's mother and either had 
acknowledged the child or had been adjudicated the child's father in a 
paternity suit. 7 The statutes granting inheritance rights traditionally have 
been construed strictly, • and the common law remains in force except as 
changed by statute.' Several United States Supreme Court decisions in the 
past decade have mandated increased scrutiny, however, of statutes limiting 
the rights of illegitimates. 10 During the Survey year, both the judiciary, rely-
ing in part upon these Supreme Court cases, and the legislature modified the 
archaic restrictions on the rights of illegitimate children by expanding their 
inheritance rights. 
The first development was in Lowell v. Kowalski, 11 in which an il-
legitimate child challenged the intermarriage r~quirement of section 7 of 
chapter 190 of the General Laws on the ground that the requirement un-
constitutionally impaired the inheritance rights of a child whose father had 
acknowledged her but had not married her mother .12 The Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld the challenge and struck down the intermarriage requirement 
as a violation of article I of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. 13 The Court upheld the other two alternative conditions for 
inheritance, that is, that the father acknowledge his child or that there be an 
adjudication of paternity. 14 Within: two months of the decision in Lowell, 
the legislature amended section 7 to eliminate intermarriage as a precondi-
tion of inheritance and to provide certain requirements for a child to claim 
' G.L. c. 190, § 7 (Acts of 1943, c. 72, § 1). 
• Pratt v. Atwood, 108 Mass. 40, 41 (1871). See Sanford v. Marsh, 180 Mass. 210, 211, 62 
N.E. 268, 268 (1902); Curtis v. Hewins, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 294, 294 (1846). 
• Sanford v. Marsh, 180 Mass. 210,211,62 N1E. 268, 268 (1902). See Plymouth v. Hey, 285 
Mass. 357, 189 N.E. 100 (1934) (grandparents of an illegitimate are not "kindred" liable for 
his support); King v. Dolan, 255 Mass. 236, 151 ~.E. 109 (1926) (an illegitimate can not be a 
pretermitted heir); Gritta's Case, 236 Mass. 204, 127 N.E. 889 (1920) (an illegitimate is not a 
"child" for purposes of the workmen's compensation law). 
•• The United States Supreme Court invalidated state statutes restricting rights of il-
legitimates, as these statutes were found in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) 
(family assistance); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (right to support by father); Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (workmen's compensation); Levy v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 68 (1%8) (wrongful death). The only Massachusetts case to date involving 
equal protection arguments has been Hanson v. Markham, 371 Mass. 262, 356 N.E.2d 702 
(1976) (G.L. c. 191, § 20, the pretermitted heir statute). Prior to the Survey year, however, the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court had intimated that the earlier version of section 7, restricting il-
legitimates' right to inherit, might be unconstitutional. Nickerson v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 6 
Mass. App. Ct. 317, 320 n.2, 375 N.E.2d 357, 359 n.2 (1978). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1243, 405 N.E.2d 135. 
" ld. at 1250, 405 N.E.2d at 141. 
" /d. At 1244, 405 N .E.2d at 137. The Court stated that, if it were called upon to decide the 
issue under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it likely would have 
found the intermarriage requirement violative of that provision as well. /d. at 1245-46, 405 
N.E.2d at 138 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)). 
•• ld. at 1250, 405 N.E.2d at 141. 
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inheritance rights through adjudication of paternity. 1 ' The third develop-
ment in the Survey year was Wrenn v. Harris,t 6 in which the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, applying the ''acknowledg-
ment" test of section 7, held that an illegitimate was a "child" entitled to 
surviving child's benefits under the Social Security Act. 17 
In Lowell, an illegitimate brought an action in the probate court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that she was the daughter of the decedent-intestate 
and was entitled to take a share of his estate as an heir. 11 The probate court 
found that the decedent was the father of the plaintiff, but that the plain-
tiff's parents had never married, and that there had never been an adjudica-
tion of paternity. 19 The parties stipulated that the father had acknowledged 
in conversation and in writing that he was the plaintiff's father. 20 Despite 
the decedent's acknowledgement of paternity, the probate court held that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to take from her father's estate pursuant to 
section 7 of chapter 190. 21 That court also held that section 7 did not 
abridge any of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under article 1 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution or under the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 22 The Supreme 
Juqicial Court granted direct review of the plaintiff's appeal on the Court's 
own motion. 23 
Rejecting a strained interpretation to save the constitutionality of the 
statute, 24 the Supreme Judicial Court chose to analyze the statute on con-
stitutional grounds with a view toward saving those portions of the statute 
which could withstand scrutiny. The Court cited two Supreme Court cases 
involving statutes whose requirements were only slightly different from 
those of section 7. 25 In Trimble v. Gordon, 26 the Supreme Court invalidated 
an Illinois statute that required both intermarriage and acknowledgement. 
" Acts of 1980, c. 396, § 7 was approved on July 7, 1980, and became effective ninety days 
later on October 5, 1980. 
" 503 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1980). 
" /d. at 227 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)). 
11 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1243, 405 N.E.2d at 137. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 1243-44, 405 N.E.2d at 137. 
" /d. at 1244, 405 N.E.2d at 137. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. at 1244-45,405 N.E.2d at 138. "Violence to the plain words" of the statute was done, 
the Court said, by the administratrix of the father's estate, by the Attorney General and by the 
probate court, all of whom had argued that the statute required either "intermarriage and 
acknowledgment" or "adjudication" as the separate avenues for inheritance by illegitimates. 
/d. 
" /d. at 1246, 405 N.E.2d at 138-39. The Court opined that if it considered § 7 on federal 
equal protection grounds, the Court expected that the requirement of intermarriage as a 
precondition to parental acknowledgment would be unconstitutional and that the requirement 
of acknowledgment of paternity alone might be an acceptable condition. /d. 
26 430 u.s. 762 (1977). 
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The Court held that the statute was overbroad27 because it eliminated the 
possibility of a "middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion 
and case-by-case determination of paternity." 28 In Lalli v. Lalli, 29 the Court 
upheld a New York state statute that required an adjudication of paternity 
as a prerequisite for inheritance. The Court found the statute to be a 
carefully considered legislative judgment of how to balance the inheritance 
rights of illegitimates with the prevention of mistake and fraud. 30 The Lalli 
Court distinguished the New York statute from that invalidated in Trimble 
by noting that the New York statute did not consider the marital status of 
the parents and that the adjudication requirement was purely evidentiary. 31 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, while intimating that application 
of those cases might achieve an acceptable result, 32 considered the Equal 
Rights Amendement of Article I of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
to be of "controlling importance" 33 and accordingly chose to analyze Sec-
tion 7 under that provision. The Court held that the key issue in section 7 
was the distinction between rights of inheritance from a mother and from a 
father. 34 Such a distinction raised the possibility of an impermissible sex-
based distinction under the Equal Rights Amendment. The analysis, 
according to the Court, required three steps: (1) does a classification based 
on sex exist; 35 (2) is there a state interest compelling enough to permit such a 
classification; 36 and (3) if so, is the statute drafted as narrowly as possibleto 
achieve only that objective. 37 
A classification based on sex existed, the Court found, for the simple 
reason that the statutory scheme distinguished between the rights of an il-
legitimate to inherit from the natural father and from the natural mother. 38 
The Court held that there was a state interest to justify some diffenmce in 
treatment, 39 given the greater difficulty of proving paternity than of proving 
maternity40 and the objective of avoiding fraudulent claims. 41 The Court 
21 /d. at 772-73. 
21 /d. at 771. 
29 439 u.s. 259 (1978). 
•• Id. at 274. 
" /d. at 267. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1346, 405 N.E.2d at 139. 
" Id. 
,. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1247, 405 N.E.2d at 139. 
" See id. at 1247, 406 N.E.2d at 139. 
'~ Id. at 1246, 1249, 405 N.E.2d at 139, 140. 
" /d. See Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1584, 1597, 393 N.E.2d 284, 291 (1979). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1247, 405 N.E.2d at 139. 
" li1. at 1248-49, 405 N.E.2d at 139-40 . 
.. Id. at 1248, 405 N.E.2d at 140. 
•• /d. at 1249, 405 N.E.2d at 140. Other state interests found by the United States Supreme 
Court, but not -enum~ated by the Lowell Court, include establishing an orderly settlement of 
estates, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,.268 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977), 
uacl protcctiJla the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws. Trimble v. 
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held, however, that the intermarriage requirement was overly restrictive in 
meeting the state's objectives. 42 Whole classes of illegitimates who other-
wise could prove paternity beyond any possibility of fraud were foreclosed 
from inheriting from their fathers because of the intermarriage require-
ment. 43 Since the distinction affected the inheritance rights of the children 
and, in its full breadth, was unsupported by a sufficient state interest, the 
Court concluded that the intermarriage requirement was unconstitutional. 44 
The Court upheld, however, the alternative of either acknowledgement or 
adjudication of paternity as legitimate methods of preventing fraud. 45 
The Court's reasoning would be convincing as an equal protection 
analysis based on a distinction between the rights of legitimates and those of 
illegitimates, and such an analysis surely could have produced the same 
result. 46 The Court's sex-discrimination analysis is strained, however, and it 
establishes a problematic precedent for Equal Rights Amendment analysis. 
Section 7 simply did not deny or abridge inheritance rights of any child 
based on his or her own sex - the gravamen of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. 47 Male and female children are treated identically. The sex distinction 
found by the Court is almost abstract, that is, between a mother and a 
father as to distribution of their property under statutes of intestate succes-
sion. No real rights of the father or the mother are involved, however. The 
right of inheritance is one to receive property from an ancestor, not a right 
of the ancestor to give property in a particular way under the intestacy 
statutes. 48 Thus, no sex-based distinction exists among those who stand to 
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977). The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a statute 
requiring intermarriage as a cOndition for inheritance by an illegitimate from the father fur-
thered a state's purported interest in promoting legitimate family relationships. Id. at 768 & 
n.l3, 769 (1977). See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1249, 405 N.E.2d at 140. 
•• Id. at 1250, 405 N.E.2d at 141. 
•• Id. 
•• I d. The Court did suggest, however, that the statute might have been too restrictive if it 
had not allowed both options of proving paternity. 
•• See Id. at 1245, 1246, 405 N.E.2d at 138; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
47 Mass. Const. art. 1, provides in part: "Equality under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin." The Court may view this 
language as going beyond the prevention of denial or abridgement of rights or privileges under 
the law. Such an expansive view would be beyond any known court-expressed theory of con-
stitutional guarantees. 
•• But see 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1247, n.7, 405 N.E.2d at 139 n.7, where the Court alludes 
in a footnote to the possibility of a third party enforcement theory, by which a child could 
assert_ his father's "right" "to pass his estate through intestacy to his issue. Intestacy, however, 
has never been viewed as a "right" of a decedent. Indeed, common law intestacy was viewed as 
a disgrace. B. LEACH, THE LAW OF WILLS 42 (2d ed. 1960). The laws of descent and distribution 
delineate the rights of heirs to property passing from an intestate. G.L. c. 190, §§ 1-8. The 
rights of the decedent are to defeat intestacy through a will, homestead or non-probate disposi-
tions. 
The third party enforcement theory would be a more defensible theory than the nexus 
analysis relied on by the Court, however, if one could establish a father's "right" to an in-
testate distribution scheme. There may be such a right if it would be unconstitutional to require 
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be injured, and the rights of persons who are subject to the sex-distinction 
are not affected. The constitutional infirmity found by means of this nexus 
between the rights of one group of persons and sex-based distinctions 
among another group of persons is not supported directly or analogously by 
any precedent found by the Court. 4' 
The Court's invitation to the legislature in Lowell to revise section 750 was 
followed two months later by the enactment of an amendment to the 
statute. 51 An illegitimate and his issue now may inherit from and through 
the father if the father acknowledges paternity or if he is adjudicated the 
father. 52 If the child is using adjudication to establish the right, he must, 
within the limitations period for bringing claims against an estate, 53 either 
deliver an authenticated copy of a judgment rendered by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction during the father's lifetime to the executor or administrator 
of the father's estate or commence an action in which the executor or ad-
ministrator is a named party and in which paternity is ultimately proved. 54 
This new restriction appears likely to be upheld against constitutional 
challenge, as the restriction furthers the legitimate state interest in im-
plementing the orderly settlement of the father's estate, without unduly 
restricting an illegitimate's rights." 
a father to write a will to achieve the same distribution as intestacy would give the mother's 
property. For example, if a man's intestate estate escheated while that of a woman passed to 
heirs, the man's need to execute a will may be considered an impermissible imposition. In that 
case, third party enforcement by the decedent's children of their father's "right" to pass_pro-
perty to heirs might have some appeal. 
•• Indeed, the simple expedient of making a will counteracts any different treatment under 
intestacy, and that is the right of the parent. That right is unaffected by section 7 of chapter 
190. 
,. The cases cited by the Court all involved discriminations among the individuals whose 
rights were involved. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1250-51, 405 N.E.2d at 141. Attorney Gen. v. 
Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284; Opi-
nion of the Justices, 374 Mass. 836, 371 N.E.2d 426 (1977) and Commonwealth v. King, 374 
Mass. 5, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977). 
" Acts of 1980, c. 396, § 7 was approved on July 7, 1980, and became effective on October 
5, 1980. In fact, the bills were being acted upon at the time of the Lowell decision. 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1251, n.10, 405 N.E.2d at 141, n.10. The statute also amended section 5 and 
rewrote section 6 of chapter 190, permitting an illegitimate to inherit through the collaterals of 
the mother. No change was made to the requirement that the parents intermarry in order for 
the illegitimate to be deemed legitimate for all purposes. G.L. c. 190, § 7. 
52 Acts of 1980, c. 396, § 7. 
" The limitations period is nine months from the time the executor or administrator gives 
bond. G.L. c. 197, § 9. 
•• Acts of 1980, c. 396 § 7. Although the statute is silent with respect to the quantum of 
evidence needed to prove paternity, the standard is the one applied to paternity suits for non-
support, proof by a "reasonable preponderance of the evidence." Roberge v. Burnham, 124 
Mass. 277, 278 (1878). Similar statutes require proof by "clear and convincing evidence." See 
UNIFORMPROBATECoDE(U.L.A.) § 2-109(2)(ii); UNIFORMPARENTAOEAcr(U.L.A.) § 4(b); 20 
PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN.§ 2107(c)(3) (Purdon); VA. CODE§ 64.1-5.2. See also Estate of Daniel 
Finigan-Proof of Heirship of Illegitimate Children of the Father, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TRUST J. 733 (1978). 
" See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,268 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977). 
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The Court in Lowell refused to decide whether and to what extent it 
might be necessary to permit the illegitimate to prove paternity in the 
absence of the father's written acknowledgment, his sworn testimony, or an 
adjudication of paternity. 56 The revised statute also is silent as to how to 
prove "acknowledgment." Later in the Survey year, in Wrenn v. Harris" 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that 
acknowledgment could be proven, under section 7 by evidence of informal 
acknowledgment by the father." The issue in Wrenn was whether an il-
legitimate was a "child" of a deceased wage earner and entitled to surviving 
child's benefits59 under the Social Security Act. 60 One way to establish that 
status under the Social Security Act is to look to a state's intestacy laws. An 
illegitimate who is considered a "child" for purposes of inheriting personal 
property under a state's intestacy laws is deemed a "child" for purposes of 
the Social Security Act. 61 The court noted that, under the amended intestacy 
law of Massachusetts, an illegitimate could inherit from his father, if the 
father had acknowledged the illegitimate. 62 The court then reasoned that, 
since the statute was silent with respect to the permissible manner of 
acknowledgment, the legislature apparently intended to leave the matter to 
the courts. 63 
B~cause the policy underlying the acknowledgment requirement was to 
avoid fraudulent claims, 64 the court concluded that the type of acknowledg-
ment necessary should be determined on a case-by-case basis. 65 In determin-
ing whether the decedent in Wrenn had "acknowledged" the child within 
the meaning of amended section 7, the court considered several facts: that 
the father had acknowledged paternity orally to his sisters, his co-workers 
and the mother's family; that the mother consistently had referred to the 
decedent as the father to her social worker and to her mother; that the 
father's sisters had written to the mother referring to her son as their 
brother's child; and that the sisters had submitted affidavits supporting 
their brother's paternity. 66 Based on these facts, the danger of fraud was 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1250, 405 N.E.2d at 141. See Houghton v. Dickinson, 196 Mass. 
389, 82 N.E. 481 (1907), for a case involving evidence establishing acknowledgment. The 
Supreme Court specifically recognized that states were free to fashion their own requirements 
of proof which were tailored to eliminate imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of 
establishing paternity. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 n.l4 (1977). 
" 503 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1980). 
" Id. at 226. 
" ld. at 224. 
60 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
6
' Id. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
62 503 F. Supp. at 225. The court based its holding on the newly revised section 7, even 
though it had been amended subsequent to the commencement of the suit. Id. 
63 503 F. Supp. at 225. There had been no-requirement of a writing under the old section 7 
and none was read into the amended acknowledgment in version. Id. at 226. 
64 Id. at 225-26. 
6
' Id. at 226. 
66 Id. 
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minimal, and the court, in holding that the child could inherit as an 
"acknowledged" illegitimate son under amended section 7, found him to be 
a "child" of the deceased wage-earner and, consequently, entitled to surviv-
ing child's benefits. 67 
Thus, in summary, the rights of an illegitimate to inherit from his father 
were expanded during the Survey year. In order for the illegitimate to in-
herit, it is no longer necessary that the parents marry. The illegitimate must 
prove only that the father acknowledged paternity or that he was ad-
judicated the father. Moreover, acknowledgment need not be proven by a 
formal writing . 
.. Jd. at 227 
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